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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF iii 
COMES NOW the Appellant, Jeremy C. Ewing, by and through his attorney of record, 
CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN of the law firm of Clark and Feeney, and responds to the State's brief. 
III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Ewing was driving in Lewiston on March 16, 2014, at which time he was stopped for 
the DUI. His Administrative License Suspension hearing was held April 10, 2014. State v. Besaw, 
155 Idaho 134,306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App.2013) was issued by the Court of Appeals on June 21, 2013. 
On July 3, 2014, Judge Stegner issued his ruling in State v. Nauert, Kootenai County Case No. CR 
2013-10176. On August 20, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Haynes, No. 
41924-2014, 2015 WL 4940664, Opinion 80, from a February 23, 2013 DUI stop. On August 24, 
2015, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Riendeau, Docket No. 41982-2014, 
Opinion No. 8 from a March 21, 2013, DUI stop. Besaw was issued before Mr. Ewing's ALS hearing 
but State v. Nauert, State v. Haynes, and State v. Riendeau, are all cases that developed the issue of 
the Standard Operating Procedures (hereinafter referred to as: "SOPs") and rule-making after Mr. 
Ewing's ALS hearing. The Supreme Court ultimately determined that the 2013 SOPs were void for 
lack of rule-making. The State in Nauert has filed a motion with the Supreme Court to dismiss the 
State's appeal of Judge Stegner's findings that the SOPs are invalid and that the ISP had over 
stepped its authority regarding the foundation require for evidence admitted in courts. 
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The District Court in Ewing did not have the benefit of the Haynes or Riendeau decisions 
with regard to its analysis of LC. §67-5279(3) issues and the use by the ALS hearing officer of the 
2013 SOPs as a basis for license a suspension. The 2013 SOPs would have been in effect at the time 
of Mr. Ewing's DUI stop and ALS hearing. Rule-making did not take place pursuant to the Idaho 
Administrative Procedures Act (IAP A) until October 22, 2014. The Court can review IDAP A Rule 
11.03.01 for September 2014, a copy of which is attached as Appendix 1. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
THE IDAHO STATE POLICE STANDARD OPERATING 
PROCEDURE FOR BREATH TESTING IS VOID, 
THEREFORE MR. EWING'S BREATH TEST IS INVALID 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF LICENSE SUSPENSION. 
In Bobeckv. Idaho Transportation Department, Docket No. 42682, 2015 Opinion No. 5, the 
Court of Appeals noted: 
This Court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: ( a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed 
the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion. LC. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision 
must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in LC. § 67-5279(3) 
and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. (Cites omitted) 
Opinion, pp.3-4 
The Idaho Transportation Department (hereinafter referred to as: "ITD") violated the 
provisions of LC. §67-5279(3) by sustaining Mr. Ewing's license suspension based on the SOPS that 
were in effect at the time of Mr. Ewing's DUI stop in 2014. There were no adequate administrative 
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rules regarding breath testing pursuant to LC. § 18-8004( 4) and I.C. § 18-8002A(3) in effect in 2013, 
as a result, ITD's statutory authority to suspend licenses was exceeded. 
The findings, inferences, conclusions and decisions of the Ewing hearing officer were made 
upon an unlawful procedure in that ITD used void SOPs as a basis to make the finding that the breath 
test was done pursuant to Idaho Code. 
Finally, the ALS decision is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion because the ALS 
hearing officers were required to use valid rules for breath testing while ISPFS was required to 
produce valid rules for breath testing. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Riendeau, No. 41982-2014, Opinion No. 81, notes: in 
State v. Haynes, No. 41924-2014, 2015 WL 4940664 (Idaho Aug. 20, 2015), this Court held that the 
2013 SOPs were void because they were not adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act 
Opinion, p. 5. 
Ewing is not a case in which an expert testified that the breath testing was accurate. The 
hearing officer relied on the SOPs. R. at p. 286 1• The SOPs were challenged at the time of the ALS 
Hearing. Tr. pp. 18-21, Rat p. 350-353. The hearing officer specifically noted in his Amended 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
Mr. Stroschein argued the following on behalf of Ewing: ... 4. The breath testing 
was not conducted within the requirements of Idaho Code, §18-8004(4), IDAPA 
Rules 11.03.01, et seq, and the recent Besaw decision. 
1 
"9. Ewing's evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho Law and ISP Standard Operating 
Procedures. 
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Rat p. 282. 
I.C. § l 8-8002A(7)( d) states specifically: 
The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances 
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in accordance 
with the requirements of section 18-8004( 4 ), Idaho Code ... 
The issue of the SOPs was challenged at the time of the ALS hearing. The SOPs were 
challenged on judicial review and the SOPs have been challenged in this appeal as a basis for 
supporting the breath test. 
Please also note the emails from ISPFS. R. at pp. 98 - 250. One would have to wonder 
exactly what expert would be called in the State ofldaho to save breath-testing. Is the Court going 
to rely on Jeremy Johnston as an expert considering his statements in the emails? 
The decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court in Riendeau and Haynes follow Mr. Ewing's 
argument regarding the SOPs and the lack of rule-making. Mr. Ewing's case is a 2014 
Administrative License Suspension. The Idaho Supreme Court found that the 2013 SOPs used in 
Mr. Ewing's case are void. 
Under Idaho Law, in order to have the force and effect oflaw, an agency action characterized 
as a rule must be promulgated according to statutory directives for rule-making. See I.C. §67-5231 
( declaring rules invalid unless adopted in substantial compliance with the requirements of IAP A). 
Therefore, in the absence of evidence of substantial compliance with rule-making procedures, this 
Court must decide that the SOPs are void and thus, do not have the full force and effect of law. If 
the SOP for breath-testing does not have the full force and effect of law it cannot be the basis for 
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ITD's action to suspend driving privileges. Any agency actions resting on the 2013 SOP for breath 
alcohol testing must be set aside. 
Please recollect that Mr. Ewing has a valuable property right in his driver's license. In Bell 
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), the Court stated: 
"Once licenses are issued, ... their continued possession may become essential in the 
pursuit of a live] ihood. Suspension of issued licenses ... involves State actions that 
adjudicates important interest of the licensee. In such cases the licenses are not to be 
taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourth Amendment." 
At p. 539. 
The Idaho Supreme Court did not have the benefit of the emails that are part of this record. 
The emails show the frivolous nature ofISPFS's attempt at thwarting valid challenges to breath 
testing. See SOPs changes from January 7, 2015; January 8, 2015; and February 13, 2015. The 
SOPs have been dumbed-down and continue to be dumbed-down for no scientific purpose. The only 
purpose for the changes to the SOP is to convict people of DUis and have their licenses suspended 
in Administrative License Suspension matters. 
ISP Forensic Services and the ITD have been on notice for a number of years that the SOPs 
were suspect but neither State agency took any action to follow rule-making until Judge Stegner 
issued his ground-breaking decision in State v. Nauert, Kootenai County Case No. CR 2013-10176, 
Supreme Court Docket No. 0042441-2014. Finally, a District Judge said enough was enough. 
The Idaho Supreme Court made the determination that the SOPs are void. As a result, Mr. 
Ewing's license suspension must be vacated. It is clear the hearing officer made his decision based 
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on the SOPs and not expert testimony. Mr. Ewing has met his burden of proof, pursuant to LC. §67-
5279(3) and LC. § l 8-8002A(7)(d). 
One wonders why the State doesn't concede the point by simply doing what the State did in 
State v. Victor Smith, 127 Idaho 77, 813 P.2d 888 (1991 ). The State, at the time of Smith, conceded 
that the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act was unconstitutional and informed Counsel of that decision 
prior to oral argument. The State then acknowledge the statute was unconstitutional at the time of 
oral argument. The State in its Briefing should concede that Mr. Ewing's license suspension should 
be vacated. 
The State may argue that the hearing officer's decision in 2014 should not be effected by the 
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in 2015. However, this position would be contrary to prior 
holdings of Idaho appellate courts. The Court can look at Gay v. County Cornmissioners of 
Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 651 P .2d 560 (Idaho App. 1982) in which the Court of Appeals 
discussed the issue of standard of review. A copy of the case is attached as Appendix 2 for the 
Court's ease ofreference. The Court noted that the District Court followed what had been a well-
established line ofldaho decisions but that the well-established line of decisions was changed during 
the pendency of the appeal by the Idaho Supreme in its decision in Cooper v. Board of County 
Cornm 'rs of Ada County, l O 1 Idaho 407, 614 P .2d 94 7 ( 1980). The Court in Gay noted that Cooper 
has fundamentally altered our perspective on the proper standard of judicial review. The Court then 
analyzed how this change should be applied to other cases. The Gay Court noted: "There are no 
constitutional limitations upon a court's choice to give either retroactive or prospective effect to a 
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decision altering a prior rule of law. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731,14, L.Ed.2d 
601 (1965)". Gay, 103 Idaho at 630,651 P.2d 564. The Court went on to note that the "pipeline 
approach" was the appropriate approach in applying a new rule on similar cases pending when the 
new rule was announced. 
The Court can look at the language from the Cooper decision: 
"It is clear there is a pressing need in Idaho for established standards and procedures 
by which particularized land use regulation is to be administered. To allow the 
discretion of local zoning bodies to remain virtually unlimited in the determination 
of individual rights is to condone government by men rather than government by 
law." 
Cooper, 101 Idaho at 411,614 P.2d at 951 
The above quote is extremely relevant to issue of ISP Forensic Services and the way it has 
handled breath testing for alcohol in the State of Idaho. It has been Jeremy Johnston and his cohorts 
at ISP using "·weasel words" rather than government by law in breath testing. Since the Ewing 
matter was in the "pipeline", the decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court in Haynes and Riendeau, 
should be applied to vacate Mr. Ewing's license suspension. The 2013 SOPs were void, therefore 
there were no rules for breath-testing. Mr. Ewing's 2014 breath test was invalid. 
The State may argue that the Supreme Court did not grant Ms. Haynes Motion in Limine 
even though the Court found the ISP breath alcohol testing standards were void. In the DUI case the 
State had the ability to bring in an expert to testify at the time of the DUI trial. In the ALS hearing 
was no expert. The State did not bring an expert to Ewing's ALS hearing; the State just relied on 
the SOPs. The Court in Haynes stated as follows: 
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The State does not contend that the 2013 SOPs were adopted m substantial 
compliance with the Act. Therefore, they are void. 
However, "[ s ]howing that the test was administered in conformity with applicable 
test procedures or expert testimony may suffice to establish an adequate foundation." 
Dach/et v. State, 136 Idaho 752, 757, 40 P.3d 110, 115 (2002). Therefore, the fact 
that the 2013 SOPs are void would not have prevented the State from establishing an 
adequate foundation for the admissibility of the test results. As stated above, the 
magistrate court ruled that the State would have to establish that the test was 
accurate. That could be done by expert testimony. Because Ms. Haynes pled guilty 
prior to trial, the magistrate court never had to determine whether the State could 
present sufficient evidence to establish that foundation. The district court did not err 
in holding that the magistrate did not err in denying the motion in limine. 
Opinion at p. 11 
There is a vast difference between what happened at the DUI Motion in Limine and the 
request that hearing officer find that the SOPs were invalid for purposes of breath testing. The 
hearing officer didn't suspend the hearing for the benefit of bringing in an expert when the challenge 
was made to the SOPs. The State's reliance on the fact that Ms. Haynes' Motion in Limine wasn't 
granted is of no effect in this case. 
The State may argue that the Supreme Court and the State of Idaho, in both Haynes and 
Riendeau, didn't go far enough regarding the argument of trying to adopt rules for breath testing. 
There are two Supreme Court decisions that the Cow1 of Appeals can't overturn. The fact is that 
the 2013 SOPs, and all SOPs for that matter, are void. The breath testing rules set out in the newly 
adopted IDAP A rules are the only things that can be applied to support the foundation for breath test 
results based upon LC. §18-8004(4) and LC. §18-8002A(3). 
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The State may argue that ISP Forensic Services properly adopted breath alcohol testing 
"rules" pursuant to prior IDAPA Rule 11.03.11.014.03.2 The fact that ISP Forensic Services went 
forward with rule-making in 2014 seems to counter the logic expressed by State. 
The State may want the Court to only rely on its interpretation of LC.§ 18-8004( 4) regarding 
the use of the SOP . However this is an ALS matter. LC. § l 8-8002A(3) states: 
Rulemaking authority of the Idaho state police. The Idaho state police may, pursuant 
to chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, prescribe by rule: 
(a) What testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under this 
section; and 
(b) What calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed to 
comply with the department's requirements. Any rules of the Idaho state 
police shall be in accordance with the following: a test for alcohol 
concentration in breath as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and 
subsection (l)(e) of this section will be valid for the purposes of this section 
if the breath alcohol testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho 
state police in accordance with section 18-8004, Idaho Code, at any time 
within ninety (90) days before the evidentiary testing. A test for alcohol 
concentration in blood or urine as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, 
that is reported by the Idaho state police or by any laboratory approved by the 
Idaho state police to perform this test will be valid for the purposes of this 
section. 
The ALS Statute is specific to rule-making. The legislature was specific that the Idaho State 
Police needed to prescribe by rule the matters noted above. The State can't get around this 
legislation despite its attempt to play games with the two decisions ofidaho Supreme Court: Haynes 
and Riendeau. ISP Forensic Services "rules" for breath-testing took effect in October of2014 and 
2 Breath tests shall be administered in confonnity with standards established by the Department. Standards 
shall be developed for each type of breath testing instrument used in Idaho, and such standards shall be issued in the 
fonn of analytical methods and standard operating procedures. 
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the legislature has made no attempt to change either I.C. § 18-8002A or I.C. § 18-8004( 4) based upon 
appellate decisions starting with Besmr. One would have to assume that if the legislature had a 
problem with the Court decisions, the legislature would have moved to change the statutory scheme. 
In Nauert, Judge Stegner challenged the ability ofISP to usurp the powers of the court with regard 
to evidentiary requirements. A copy of the Judge Stegner's decision is attached as Appendix 3 for 
the Court's convenience. 
A argument may be raised that somehow the Supreme Court, in Haynes and Riendeau, 
missed the distinction between "rules" and "standards". However, this argument doesn't seem to 
be supported by the Court's language in the Haynes case: 
A "rule" under the Administrative Procedure Act is "the whole or a part of an agency 
statement of general applicability that has been promulgated in compliance with the 
provisions of this chapter and that implements, interprets, or prescribes: (a) Law or 
policy; or (b) The procedure or practice requirements of an agency." LC. § 67-
5201 (19). The approval and certification standards would constitute a rule under the 
Act. If they are not adopted in compliance with the Act, they are "voidable unless 
adopted in substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter," LC.§ 67-
5231 (1). 
At p. 10. 
It would be hard to believe that the Idaho Supreme Court would not have been aware of LC. 
§67-5201(21). 
To finally put to rest this issue that the Supreme Court in Haynes got it wrong, the Court can 
look at the briefing filed by the State in Haynes. Pertinent sections of the Respondent's Brief filed 
by the Paul R. Panther and Lori A. Fleming are attached hereto as Appendix 4. The State devoted 
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17 pages of argument in an attempt to convince the Court that the SOPs weren't rules, but standards. 
In Haynes the State seems to argue that Ms. Haynes had to file some kind ofrequcst for declaratory 
judgment to overturn the SOPs. Obviously, the Supreme Court did not think much of the State's 
argument. The Court of Appeals should not think much of the State's argument in Mr. Ewing's case. 
The State in its Respondent's Brief states as follows: 
Mr. Ewing raises no challenge to the Hearing Examiner's decision that Mr. Ewing 
has failed to meet his burden pursuant to LC.§ 18-8002A(7)(a-c) and (e). Any issue 
that could have been raised pursuant to LC. § l 8-8002A(7) has been waived. Kugler 
v. Drowns, 119 Idaho 687,809 P.2d 1116(1991), Wheeler v. JTD, 148 Idaho 378, 
223 P .3d 761 (Ct. App. 2009). However, Mr. Ewing did not raise any LC. § l 8-
8002A(7) issues before the Hearing Examiner. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 3 
Clearly, Mr. Ewing raised an LC. § 18-8002A(7)( d) issue as the breath test wasn't 
administered in accordance with the requirements of LC.§ 18-8004(4). The Transcript sets out the 
argument, the hearing officer notes the argument in his decision. The State tries to mislead the 
Court. 
Mr. Ewing has met his burden of proof regarding the foundation for breath testing -No SOPs, 
No valid breath test - No license suspension. 
The State ofldaho, in State v. Nauert, Supreme Court Case No. 42441, has filed a motion 
to dismiss the appeal. One would have to believe that the Attorney General's Office has determined 
that the Idaho Supreme Court's decisions in Haynes and Riendeau were correct and there is no 
reason to continue a losing argument in State v. Nauert. A copy of the motion is attached as 
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Appendix 5. 
Obviously the Supreme Court determined that there is no meaningful distinction between 
rules and standards in the context of \vhether something promulgated by an executive agency can be 
treated as the law. So long as whatever it is claims the ability to affect the lives of citizens, the Idaho 
Administrative Procedures Act must be followed. It is a simple concept that is clearly expressed 
in the fact that the State of Idaho has moved to dismiss its appeal in Nauert. 
At this point in time, the Court may want to consider the frivolous nature of ITD's attempt 
to continue this appeal process. Although attorney fees weren't requested below or in the initial 
briefing, one would have to believe because of the case law that has developed, the State should 
simply do as the Deputy Attorney General is doing in State v. Nauert, and agree that the SOPs are 
void. There was no expert testimony to save the breath test, therefore, the breath tests are invalid 
and the license suspensions should be vacated. The Court can use I.C. § 12-117 in the award of 
attorney fees to Mr. Ewing. The State is continuing the appeal process despite the overwhelming 
authority that Mr. Ewing was correct in his position that the SOPs were void and that the State did 
not pursue rule-making. As a result, the foundation for the breath test is not found on this record and 
the license suspension is invalid. The Court is aware that this is an administrative proceeding 
involving a State agency. 
THERE IS NO DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
LICENSE SUSPENSION HEARINGS. 
The State, in its brief cites the Court to cases that aren't specific to a Driver's license 
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suspension. Mr Ewing cites the Court to a United States Supreme Court decision that is specific to 
license suspensions. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172, (1977). The U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1vfackey v. Monrrym, 443 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed2d 321, (1979) stated: 
Here, as in Love, the private interest affected is the granted license to operate a motor 
vehicle. More particularly, the driver's interest is in continued possession and use of 
his license pending the outcome of the hearing due him. As we recognized in Love, 
that interest is a substantial one, for the Commonwealth will not be able to make a 
driver whole for any personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered by 
reason of any delay in redressing an erroneous suspension through post-suspension 
review procedures. 431 U.S. at 113. 97 S. Ct. at 1728. ( emphasis added) 
Nfackey at p. 11 
The State cited to Federal Deposit Ins. Corp v. Aiallen, 486 U.S. 230, l 08 S.Ct. 1780, 100 
L.Ed.2d 265 (1988). The State fails to mention the fact pattern found in the },/fallen case. Mr. 
Mallen was indicted by a federal grand jury in the North District of Iowa. He was charged with 
making false statements to the FDIC in violation of 18 USC § 101 and was making false statements 
to the Farmers State Bank with the purpose of influencing the actions of the FDIC in violation of 18 
USC § 1014. While Mr. Ewing plead to a $300.00 inattentive driving charge in State of Idaho v. 
Jeremy C. Ewing, Nez Perce County Case No. CR 2014-2048. In the },fallen case there was federal 
legislation that required a hearing to be held within thirty (30) days of a request for hearing and 
required that the suspended bank officer have the decision within sixty (60) days of the hearing. 
Thus, at a maximum, the suspended officer received the decision within ninety days of his or her 
request for hearing. The Supreme Court in the Mallen case focused on whether the federal 
legislation protected the bank officer's constitutional rights and the right of the State to protect the 
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interests of depositors and maintain the public confidence in the banking institution. The Court 
found that the congressional legislation provided the necessary safeguards for the individual who had 
a protected right. 
In Mr. Ewing's case, the statute involved is I.C. § 18-8002A. The legislature, obviously being 
involved in the protection ofldaho roadways, determined due process was satisfied as follows: "If 
a hearing is requested, the hearing shall be held vvithin 20 days of the date the hearing request was 
received by the department unless this period is, for good cause shown, extended by the hearing 
officer for one ten day period." I.C. § l 8-8002A(7) 
Mr. Ewing's opening brief sets out the time-frames involved in what happened in his case. 
There was no good cause shown for the ALS hearing being held outside the statutory time of 20 
days. Obviously, the legislature knew, when it set the statutory time frame, that a hearing officer 
would have the authority to administer oaths, examine witnesses and take testimony, issue subpoenas 
and the like. For the State to argue that it was somehow Mr. Ewing's fault for having a hearing 
officer issue subpoenas is ridiculous. Please recall that without at least some ability to examine what 
the State did, there wouldn't be any meaningful hearing within an appropriate time frame which is 
required in post suspension hearings. 
Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hoglancl, 14 7 Idaho 774, 215 P .3d 494 (2009) is a case cited 
by the State. The Comi in Hogland specifically notes: BT A's argument that it was entitled to a 
pre-deprivation hearing before the stop-work order was issued fails under the A1athews balancing 
test. We are not dealing with a request for pre-deprivation hearing in Mr. Ewing's case. Also, the 
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Court in Hogland was not certain that BTA had a constitutionally protected property right in its 
building permit. 
The State cites the Court to cases that aren't relevant to the issues before the Court in Mr. 
Ewing's case. Due process was noted in the Dixon v. Love and Mackey decisions regarding the loss 
of a Driver's license. The State can't make a driver whole for ill1Y delay in Mr. Ewing's case. 
The State continues to make the odd statement that Mr. Ewing did not raise any LC. § 18-
8002(7) issues, but clearly Mr. Ewing did, as noted above and noted by the hearing officer's 
decision. There was an erroneous deprivation of a property right in Mr. Ewing's administrative 
license suspension case, his driver's license. 
It is interesting that the State argued previously, that attachments to Mr. Ewing's opening 
brief weren't part of the record. The State, in its Supplemental Brief in Gary Alexander Hern, vs. 
State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, Court of Appeals, Docket No. 42287, attached 
exhibits that weren't before the hearing officer or the district court. There was no motion to augment 
the record in Hern as permitted by statute. 
The State argues: "Finally, Mr. Ewing does not indicate that he suffered any actual harm or 
that there was a violation of any fundamental right." Respondent's Brief, p. 17. One has to wonder 
if the State actually read the opening brief of Mr. Ewing and the case law that notes that a right to 
a driver's license is a fundamental right that due process applies to. The opening brief of Mr. Ewing 
cites the Court to Federal and State case law that supports the position that the suspension of a motor 
vehicle operator's license adjudicates important property interest of the licensee. 
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The State once again points to "invited error" as a reason for the Court to disregard Mr. 
Ewing's argument. Hmvever, the State doesn't note what facts apply to the Invited Error Doctrine 
or how Mr. Ewing invited error. Mr. Ewing requested a hearing and requested subpoenas pursuant 
to LC. § l 8-8002A, so how is that invited error? The hearing \Vas set for April 10, 2014. The license 
suspension began on March 16, 2014, with a temporary license being good for thirty days or until 
April 15, 2014. A stay of the suspension was not entered until April 16, 2015. 
THE ACTIONS OF THE HEARING OFFICER 
VIOLATE MR. EWING'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS. 
With regard to the equal protection argument and the issue of the lack of performance 
verification, the initial briefing filed by Mr. Ewing is sufficient as the argument made by the State 
under its Issue 3 and Issue 4 is just a re-tread of prior arguments and really has no support in the law. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
The SOP is not a "rule" as there was no compliance with the process that is required in 
making administrative rules. The Court must find that ISP Forensic Services has failed in its 
statutory duties to set out administrative rules for breath alcohol testing in the State ofldaho. I.C. 
§ l 8-8002A(7)(c), LC. § l 8-8002A(7)(d) and I.C. § 18-8004( 4) allow for the attack of the breath test 
result. There is no valid breath test. 
The Court can also review LC. §67-5279(3) in that: for ITD to use the SOP, it would be a 
violation of a constitutional or statutory provision and would be in excess of the statutory authority 
of the agency, and therefore, would be an unlawful procedure. The use of the SOP would not be 
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supported by substantial evidence and would be arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. 
The Court is going to have to decide whether the process used now by ITD for fair post-
suspension hearings is actually constitutional. ITD does not support a fair hearing for a driver. ITD 
makes it as hard as possible for a driver to meet his burden. 
Finally, there is no equal protection in these matters for drivers who request any sort of 
subpoena or relevant evidence. 
Since the hearing officer made no sort of record regarding "good cause" and didn't have a 
hearing, the Court can also find that the decision to expand the hearing past the twenty (20) day limit 
is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. The Court can apply I.C. §67-
5279(3). 
The Court should find that the license suspension was improper and enter an order directing 
ITD to vacate the license suspension for Mr. Ewing. 
DATED this 23th day of October, 2015. 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
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I hereby certify on the 23th 
day of October, 2015, a true copy 
of the foregoing instrument 
was: __.,, Mailed 
Faxed 
Hand delivered to: 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 321 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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CHAPTER 01 
IDAHO STATE FORENSIC LABORATORY 
11.03.01 - RULES GOVERNING ALCOHOL TESTING 
000. LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
The Dir.!clor of the Idaho State Police has general ru!emaking authority to prescribe rules and reguiatlons for alcohol 
testing, pursuam to Section 67-290 I. Idaho Code. { 4-7- ! l) 
001. TITLE ANO SCOPE. 
01. Title. These rules shall be ci'.cd as IDAPA I 1.03.01. "Rules Governing Alcohoi Testing." (4-7-1 !) 
02. Scope. The rules relate to th:: govem::rncc and operation of the Alcohol Testing Program. (4-7-11) 
002. \VRITTEN INTERPRET A TIO NS. 
There arc no written interpretations of this rule. (4-7-ll) 
003. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS. 
There is no provision for administrative appeals before the Idaho State Police under this chapter. (4-7-11) 
004. INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE. 
The following are incorporated by reference in this chapter of rules: (4-7-11) 
01. Conforming Products List of Evidential Breath Measurement Devices {revised 3/11/2010). 
This document is available on the internet at http://edocketaccess.gpo.gov!20 I 0.1pdf/20 I 0-5242.pdL ( 4-7-11) 
005. MAILING ADDRESS AND OFFICE HOURS. 
The mailing address is Idaho State Police, Forensic Services, 700 S. Stratford Drive Suite 125, Meridian, ID 83642-
6206. Lobby hours arc Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. lo 5:00 p.m. exc.:pt holidays designated by the stale of Idaho. 
(4-7-11) 
006. PUBLIC RECORDS AVAlLABILITY. 
This rule is subject to and in compliance with the Public Records Act. ( 4-7-11) 
007. WEBSITE. 
Alcohol Testing infonnation is available on the internet at hHp:l/www.isp.idaho.goviforcnsicsfindcx.html. ( 4-7-11) 
008. -009. (RESERVED) 
010. DEFINITlONS AND ABBREVIATIONS. 
01. Alcohol. "Alcohol" shall mean the chemical compounds of ethyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, or 
isopropyl alcohol. (9-2-l 4)T 
02. 
standard. 
Approved Vendor. "Approved vendor'' shall mean a source/provider/manufacturer of an approved 
(9-2-14)T 
03. Blood Alcohol Analysis. "Biood alcohol analysis" shall mean 11.n analysis of blood to determine the 
concentration of alcohol present, (7-1-93) 
04. Breath Alcohol Analysis. "Brcalh alcohol analysis" shall mean an analys:s of breath to determine 
the concentration of alcohol present. (7-1-93) 
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05. Breath Alcohol Test. "Breath alcohol test" shall mean a breath sample or series of separate breath 
samples provided during a breath testing sequence. (9-2-!4)T 
06. Breath Alcohol Testing Sequence. "Brealh alcohol testing sequence" shall mean a sequence of 
events as detennined by !he Idaho Stale Police Forensic Services, which may be directed by the instrument, the 
Operator, or both, and may consist of air blanks, perfonnance verification, internal standard checks, and breath 
samples. (9·2-14)T 
07. Breath Testing Certification Class. "Breath testing certification class" shall mean a department 
approved training class for prospective or uncertified breath alcohol Operators/Breath Testing Specialists. (9·2- l 4)T 
08. Breath Te5ting Specialist (BTS). "Breath Testing Specialist" shall mean an operator who has 
completed advanced training approved by the department and are certified to perfonn routine instrument 
maintenance, leach instrument operation skills, proctor proficiency tests for instrument Operators, and testifying as 
an expert on alcohol physiology and instrument function in court. (9-2-14)T 
09. Calibration. "Calibration" shall mean a set of laboratory operations which establish under 
specified conditions, the relationship between values indicated by a measuring instrument or measuring system, or 
values represented by a material, and the corresponding known values of a measurement. (9-2- I4)T 
10. Certificate of Analysis. "Certificate of analysis" shall mean II certificate staling the standards used 
for performance verification have been tested and approved for use by the ISPFS or are manufactured by an ISO 
17025:2005 vendor and are traceable to N.I.S.T. standards. (9-2-l4)T 
11. Certificate of Instrument Calibration. "Certificate of instrument calibration" shall mean a 
certificale stating that an individual breath alcohol testing instrument has been evaluated by the ISPFS and found to 
be suitable for forensic alcohol testing. The certificate bears the signature of the calibration analyst at Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services, and the effective date of the instrument approval. {9-2-l4)T 
12. Changeover Class. "Changeover class" shall mean a training class for currently certified 
Operators during which the Operator is taught theory, operation, and proper testing procedure for a new make or 
model of instrument being adopted by their agency. Breath Testing Specialists complete BTS training that qualifies 
them lo perform BTS duties related to the new make or model instrument. (9-2-14)T 
13. Department. "Department" shall mean the Idaho State Police. (7-1-93) 
14. Evidentiary Test. "Evidentiary test" shall mean a blood, breath, or urine test perfonned on a 
subject/individual for potential evidentiary or legal purposes. A distinction is made between evidentiary testing and 
non-quantitative screening/monitoring. (9-2-14)T 
15. Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS). "Idaho State Police Forensic Services" shall mean 
a division of the Idaho State Police. ISPFS is dedicated to providing forensic science services to the criminal justice 
system ofldaho. ISPFS is the administrative body for the blood and breath alcohol testing programs in Idaho. 
(9-2-l4)T 
16. Laboratory. "Laboratory" shall mean the place at which specialized devices, instruments and 
methods are used by trained personnel to measure the concentration of alcohol in samples of blood, vitreous humor, 
urine, or beverages for law enforcement purposes. (9-2-l4)T 
17. MIP/MIC. "MIP/M!C" shall mean an abbreviation used to designate minor in possession or minor 
in consumption of alcohol. (9-2-14)T 
18. Operator Certification. "Operator certification" shall mean the condition of having satisfied the 
training requirements for administering breath alcohol tests as established by the department. (9-2-14)T 
19. Operator. "Operator" shall mean an individual certified by the department as qualified by training 
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20. Performance Verification. "Performance verification" shall mean a verification of the accuracy of 
the breath testing instrument utilizing a perfonnance verification standard. Performance verification should be 
reported to lhree decimal places. While ISPFS uses the term performance verification, manufacturers and others may 
use a term such as "calibration check" or "simulator check." (9·2-!4}T 
21. Performance Verification Standard. "Performance verification standard" shall mean an ethyl 
alcohol standard used for field performance verifications. The standard is provided or approved, or both, by the 
department. (9-2-14)T 
22. Proficiency Testing. "Proficiency testing" shall mean a periodic analysis of blood, urine, or other 
liquid specimen(s) whose alcohol content is unknown lo the testing laboratory, to evaluate the capability of that 
laboratory to perform accurate analysis for alcohol concentration. (9-2-14)T 
23. Quality Control. "Quality control" shall mean an analysis of referenced samples whose alcohol 
content is known, which is performed with each batch of blood, vitreous humor, urine or beverage analysis to ensure 
that the laboratory's determination of alcohol concentration is reproducible and accurate. (9·2-14)T 
24. Recertification Class. "Recertification class" shall mean a training class offered by the department 
for currently certified personnel, completion of which results in uninterrupted continuation of their BTO or BTS 
status for an additional 2 years. (9-2-14)T 
25. Urine Alcohol Analysis. "Urine alcohol analysis" shall mean an analysis of urine to determine the 
concentration of alcohol present. (7-1-93) 
26. Waiting Period/Monitoring Period/Deprivation Period/Observation Period. "Waiting Period/ 
Monitoring Period/Deprivation Period/Observation Period" shall mean individual titles used for the time period prior 
to administering a breath alcohol test, in which an officer monitors the test subject/individual. (9·2-14)T 
011. (RESERVED) 
012. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
01. Repeal of Prior Rules. All rules governing the Idaho State Forensic Laboratory are repealed, 
specifically Idaho State Police Emergency Rules I 1.03.1, I 1.03.2, I 1.03.3, I J.03.4, I 1.03.5 and I 1.03.6. (7-1-93) 
02. Continuation of Policies. All policies, training manuals, approvals of instruments, and/or 
certifications of officers in effect when the alcohol program was managed by the Department of Health and Welfare 
shall continue to be in effect in the Idaho Stale Police until the policy, training manual, approval and/or certification is 
changed or deleted by the Idaho State Police. (7-1-93) 
013. REQUIREMENTS FOR LABO RA TORY ALCOHOL ANALYSIS. 
01. Laboratory. Any laboratory desiring to perfonn urine alcohol, vitreous humor, blood alcohol, or 
beverage analysis shall meet the following standards: (9-2-14)T 
a. The laboratory shall prepare and maintain a written procedure governing its method of analysis, 
including guidelines for quality control and proficiency testing. A copy of the procedure shall be provided to ISPFS 
for initial approval. Whenever procedure, protocol, or method changes (however named) are adopted by a laboratory, 
a copy of the update with the changes clearly indicated shall be approved by ISPFS before implementation; 
(9-2-14)T 
b. The laboratory shall provide adequate facilities and space for the procedure used. The laboratory 
alcohol related functions shall be subject to an assessment by either an accrediting body or the department each 
calendar year, and the results from the annual audit shall be submitted to the department. The assessment shall be at 
the expense of the laboratory; (9-2- l 4)T 
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C~ Specin1,;;ns shall b~ n1aintained in a iimited ,1ccess ~nd secure storage area prior to anab;sis . .r\ chain 
of custody shall be maintained while the cvidcn;;e is in the lnborntory; - • (9-2-14)T 
, d. Ai! i;1s\mmenl?tion, equipm_ent, rc~i.::~11:s and .glassware necc5S<l~ for the perfonnu:1~e of the 
cnosen prncedure shall oe on nand or readily avaaao!e on !nc laboratory premises. Instrument ma;ntemmce 
documenlntion shall be available for rs:view by the departmer.t; (9-2-i4)T 
e. The laboratory shall participate in approved proficiency testing and p.iss this proficiency testing 
according to standards set bv the deoartment. Laboratories must particioate in pro!icicncv iesting from n department 
approved provider at least once a caiencar yei!r. Approved prnviders inciude Nation2il Highwny T~ansport.ation Safety 
Adminisiration (NHTSA) and Collaborntive Testing Services (CTS). Each test consists of at least four (4) blood 
samples spiked with an unknown concentration of I alcohol, and possibly other volatiles, for qualitative 
determination. Participating laboratories must obtain 1cicncy tests from approved providcis and arc responsible 
for all costs associated with obtaining and analyzing such tests. Results from proficiency tests must be submitted by 
the due date to the test provider and ISPFS. Results not submitted to a test provider within the allowed time do not 
qua!iry as a proficiency test. An alcohol concentration range is de!ennined from the target value and ±3.0 standard 
deviations as provided by the proficiency test provider. Reported values must fall within this range. If a laboratory 
determines more than one (I) alcohol value for a given sample, the mean value of results will be submitted and 
evaluated. Upon sa!isfoctory completion of an approved proficiency test, a certificate of approval will be issued by 
the department co lhe participating Jnboratory. Approval to perfonn legal blood alcohol determinations is continued 
until the results of the next prnficiency test are reviewed and notification is sent to the respective laboratory by 
ISPFS. Failure to pass a proficiency test shall resuh in immediate suspension of testing by an analyst or laboratory in 
the form of a written inquiry from the department. The test is graded as a unsuccessful when the mean results are 
outside the tolerance range estnblished from the accepted mean values. The laboratory shall have thirty (30) calendar 
days to respond lo the department inquiry. The deportment shall notify the laboratory within fourteen (14) caiendar 
days regarding corrective action steps necessnry to lift the testing suspension, or the department may issue a written 
revocation. The department shall not lift a proficiency testing related suspension or revocation until a successful 
proficiency test has been completed by 1he individual analyst or laboratory. (9-2-14)T 
f. For n laboratory performing blood, urine, vftreous humor, or beverage analysis for alcohol, 
approval shall be awarded to the lnborntory director or primary analyst responsible for that laboratory. The 
responsibility for the correct perfom,ance of tests in that laboratory rests with that person; however, the duty of 
perfonning such tests may be delegated to any person designated by such director or primary analyst. The department 
may temporarily suspend or pcnnancntly revoke the approval of a laboratory or analyst if the listed requirements ore 
not met. The department will issue the suspension or revocation in writing to the laboratory director or primary 
nnalyst responsible; (9-2-14)T 
g. Reinstatement after revocation requires completed corrective action of any items listed on the 
revocation documentation issued by the depnnment. Documentation of corrective actions taken to address the 
nonconfonnities shall be submitted to the department for review. Once the department is satisfied that the laboratory 
is in compiiam:e with ali requirements, the department will issue written approval for the resumption of testing by 
that laboratory or analyst. A laboratory may appeal a suspension or revocation to the Director of the depanmcnt. 
(9-2-14)T 
02. Blood Collection. Blood collection shali be uccomplished ncco;ding to the following requirements: 
{7-1-93) 
a. Blood samoles shall be col!ected using sterile, dry syringes and hypodermic needles, or other 
equipment of equivalent steriiity; (7-1-93) 
b. The skin at the area of puncture shall be cleansed thoroughly and disinfected with an aqueous 
solution of a nonvolatile antiseptic. Alcohol or phenolic solutions shall not be used as a skin antiseptic; (7-1-93) 
c. Blood specimens shall contain at least ten ( I 0) milligrams of sodium fluoride per cubic centimeter 
of blood plus an appropriate anticoagulant. {4-4-13) 
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03. Blood Reported. The results of analysis 011 blood for alcohol com::ell!ration shall be reported in 
units of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic centimeters of whole blood. (9-2-14)T 
04. Urine Collection. Urine samples shall be collected in clean, dry containers. (9-2-14)T 
05. Urine Reported. The results of analysis on urine for alcohol co11centratio11 shall be reported in 
units of grams of alcohol per sixty-seven (67) mi!!iliters of urine. Results of alcohol analysis of urine specimens shaH 
be accompanied by a warning statement about the questionable value of urine alcohol results. (9-2-l4)T 
06. 
three (J) years. 
Records. All records regarding proficiency tests, quality control and results shall be retained for 
(7-1-93) 
014. REQUIREMENTS FOR PERFORMING BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING. 
01. Instruments. Each breath testing instrument model shall be approved by the department and shall 
be listed in the "Conforming Products List of Evidential Breath Measurement Devices" published in the Federal 
Regisler by the United States Department of Transportation as incorporated by reference in Section 004 of this rule. 
The department will maintain a list of benchlop and portable instruments approved for evidentiary testing use in 
Idaho. Each individual breath testing instrument must be certified by the department. The department may, for cause, 
remove a specific instrument by serial number from evidential testing and suspend or withdraw certification thereof. 
(9-2-l4)T 
02. Report. Each direct breath testing instrument shall report alcohol concentration as grams of alcohol 
per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath. (7-1-93) 
03. Administration, Breath tests shall be administered in conformity wilh standards established by the 
department. Standards shall be developed for each type of breath testing instrument used in Idaho, and such standards 
shall be issued in the form of Idaho administrative rules, ISPFS analytical methods, and ISPFS standard operating 
procedures. (9-2-14)T 
a. The breath alcohol test must be administered by an operator (BTO or BTS) currently certified in the 
use of the instrument. (9-2-l4)T 
b. Prior to administering the observation period, any foreign objects/materials which have the 
potential to enter the instrument/breath tube or may present a choking hazard should be removed. If a foreign object/ 
material (e.g. dental work, gum, chewing tobacco, food, piercing) is left in the mouth during the entirety of the fifteen 
(15) minute monitoring period, any polential external alcohol contamination should not interfere with the results of 
the subsequent breath alcohol tests. (9-2-l4)T 
c. Prior to evidentiary breath alcohol testing, the subject/individual should be observed for fifteen (15} 
minutes. The operator should be alert for any event that might influence the accuracy of the breath alcohol test. 
During the observation period the subject/individual should not be allowed to smoke, drink, eat, or belch/burp/vomit/ 
regurgitate. (9-2- l 4)T 
d. If mouth alcohol is suspected or indicated by the testing instrument, the operator should begin 
another fifteen ( I 5) minute observation period before repeating the testing sequence. If during the observation period 
the subject/individual vomits or regurgitates material from the stomach into the breath pathway, the observation 
period should start over. If there is doubt as to the events occurring during the observation period ( e.g. silent burp, 
belch, vomit, regurgitation), the officer should evaluate the instrument results for any indication of mouth alcohol. 
(9-2-14)T 
e. A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken during the testing 
procedure and preceded by air blanks. The subsequent breath samples performed with a portable breath testing 
instrument should be approximately two (2) minutes apart or more. If the subject/individual fails or refuses to provide 
n subsequent, adequate sample as requested by the operator, the single lest result shall be considered valid. lf only a 
single test result is used, then a fifteen (15) minute observation period must be observed. For hygienic reasons, the 
operator should use a new mouthpiece for each series of tests. (9-2-l4)T 
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f. The operator has the discretion to end breath testing, repeat breath testing, or request a blood draw 
at any point during the testing process as !he circumslames require (including but not limited to lack of sample 
correlation, fock of subject participation or cooperation, subject is incoherent or incapable of following instructions. 
subject incapacitation). lfa subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a subsequent, adequate sample as requested 
by the operator, lhe results obtained are still considered valid, provided the failure to supply the requested samples 
was the fault of the subject/individual and not the operator. (9-2-14}T 
g. A third breath sample should be collected if the first two (2) two results differ by more than 0.OZ g/ 
2lOL alcohol. Unless mouth alcohol is indicated or suspected, it is not necessary to repeat the observation period 
prior to obtaining a third breath sample. (9·2·14)T 
h. The results for subsequent breath samples should correlate within 0.02 g/2 l 0L alcohol to show 
consistent sample delivery, indicate the absence of RF!, and to indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the 
subject/individual's brealh pathway as a contributing factor to the breath results. (9·2· l 4)T 
i. In the event of an instrument failure, the operator should attempt to utilize another instrument or 
have blood drawn. (9-2-l4)T 
04. Training. Each individual operator (BTO or BTS) shall demonstrate sufficient training to operate 
the instrument correctly. This shall be accomplished by successfully completing a training course approved by the 
department on each instrument model utilized by the operator. Operator certifications issued after July I, 2013 are 
valid for two (2) calendar years from the course completion date. The department may revoke individual operator 
(BTO/BTS) certification for cause. 
(9·2-14)T 
05. Performance Verification Checks. Each breath testing instrument shall be checked for accuracy 
with a performance verification standard approved by the department. Performance verification checks shall be 
perfonned according to a procedure established by the department and shall be documented. The official time and 
date of the performance verification is the time and date recorded on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the 
log. (9·2·14)T 
a. A performance verification check shall occur within twenty-four (24) hours before or after an 
evidentiary lest The benchtop instrument requires a perfonnance verification check as part of the testing sequence. 
On the portable instrument, multiple breath alcohol tests may be covered by a single performance verification. 
(9-2-14)T 
b. A performance verification 011 a portable instrument consists of two (2) samples at either the 0.08 
or 0.20 level. Both samples must be run with the same performance verification standard. Three (3) attempts at 
obtaining an acceptable perfonnance verification are allowed. Troubleshooting measures may be employed during 
!his process. If the third performance verification fails, the instrument shall be taken out of service. The instrument 
shall not be returned to service until it has been calibrated and certified by ISPFS. (9-2-I4)T 
c. A performance verification acquired during a breath testing sequence on an approved benchtop 
instrument consists of one (I) sample at either the 0.08 or 0.20 level. A performance verification acquired outside the 
breath testing sequence on an approved benchtop instrument consists of two (2) samples at either the 0.08 or 0.20 
level. Three (3) attempts at obtaining an acceptable performance verification are allowed. Troubleshooting measures 
may be employed during this process. If the third perfonnance verification fails, the instrument must be taken out of 
service. The instrument must not be returned to service until it has been calibrated and certified by lSPFS. (9-2-14)T 
d. 
lllrget value. 
Perfonnance verification checks must be within +/- I 0% of the performance verification standard 
(9·2·14)T 
e. A wet bath 0.08 performance verification standard should be replaced with fresh standard 
approximately every twenty-five (25) verifications or every calendar month, whichever comes first. For a closed 
loop, recirculating system (e.g. the lntox 5000 series), the 0.08 performance verification standard should be replaced 
with fresh standard approximately every one hundred ( I 00) verifications or every calendar month, whichever comes 
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first (9-2-14)T 
f. A wet bath 0.20 perfonnance verification standard should be replaced with fresh standard 
approximately every twenty-five (25) verifications. (9-2-14)T 
g. Ory gas performance verification standards may be used continuously without replacement until 
the canister is spent or the expiration dale is reached. (9-2- l 4)T 
h. Performance verification standards should not be used beyond the expiration daie. (9-2-!4)T 
i. If Section l 8-8004C, Idaho Code, (excessive alcohol concentration) is applicable, then a 0.20 
perfonnance verification mus! be run and results documenled once per calendar month. Failure to perform a 0.20 
perfonnance verification will not invalidate any tests where Section 18-8004C, Idaho Code,_is not applicable. A 
performance verification with a 0.20 standard does not need to be performed within twenty-four (24) hours of an 
evidentiary breath test in excess of 0.20 g/21 OL alcohol. (9-2- l 4)T 
j. Temperature of the wet bath simulator shall be between thirty-three point five degrees Celsius 
(33.5"C) and thirty-four point five degrees Celsius (34.S0 C} in order for the performance verification results to be 
valid. (9·2-14)T 
k. An agency may run additional performance verification standard levels at their discretion. 
(9-2-14)T 
06. Records. Operators must document and retain test results (i.e. written log, printout, or electronic 
database). All records regarding maintenance and results shall be retained for three (3) years. ISPFS is not responsible 
for storage of documentation not generated by ISPFS. (9-2-14)T 
07. Deficiencies. Failure to meet any of the conditions listed in Sections 013 and 014. Any laboratory 
or breath testing instrument may be disapproved for failure to meet one ( l) or more of the requirements listed in 
Sections 013 and 014, and approval may be withheld until the deficiency is corrected. (4-7-I I) 
08. Standards. Premixed alcohol simulator solutions shall be from an approved vendor and explicitly 
approved in writing by the department before distribution within Idaho. Dry gas standards from ISO 17025:2005 
certified providers are explicitly approved by the department for use in Idaho without evaluation by the department. 
(9·2-14)T 
09. MIP/MIC. The presence or absence of alcohol is the determining factor in the evidence in an MIP/ 
MIC case. The instrumentation used in obtaining the breath sample is often the same instrumentation utilized for 
acquiring DUI evidence. The different standard of evidence requires different standards for the procedure. (9-2-l4)T 
a. Fifteen (15) minute observation period: The monitoring/observation period is not required for the 
MIP/MIC procedure. (9-2-l4)T 
b. 
instrument 
The breath alcohol test must be administered by an operator currently certified in the use of that 
(9-2-l4)T 
c. The instrument used must be certified by ISPFS. The instrument only needs to be initially certified 
by ISPFS. Initial certification shows that the instrument responds to alcohols and not to acetone. The instrument does 
not need to be checked regularly or periodically with any of the 0.08 or 0.20 standard. (9-2-14)T 
d. The officer should have the individual being tested remove nil loose foreign material from their 
mouth before testing. False teeth, Pl!riial plates, or bridges installed or prescribed by a dentist or physician do not 
need to be removed to obtain a vahd test. The officer may allow the individual to briefly rinse their mouth out with 
water prior to the breath testing. Any alcohol containing material left in the mouth during the entirety of the breath 
test sampling could contribute to the results in the breath testing sequence. (9-2-14)T 
e. A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken from the subject and 
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preceded by an air blank. Th~ subsequent breath sa,np1c;; do not need to be consecutive sarnples fron1 the SJn1e 
subject. The individual br·=a!h samples should be approximately tv:o (2) minu!es apart or rnore. ,.1~ defici~nt or 
insufficient san1p!e docs not automat!Caily invalidate a test sample. The operator should use a nc\v rnouthpiecc for 
each individt:al. (9-2-14)T 
f, A third breath sarnp!e is required if the first t\VO (2) results differ by more than 0.02 g/21 OL alcohoL 
' ' ' 1· ' (-' • - II . " • fl 0'.1 ,- • '" 1 h I I . • '. • •• . . ., 111 tne even! tnot n ; tnrcc . .J) sampics Hh1 ou.tst:-1~ tn:; u. ~:. gr.! 1 ~~ a.C?t Ch corre1at1oy;, iHHJ ~esnng tn}::hcatcs or t!1c~ 
officer suspects mouth alcohol, they n1ust aan11n1stcr a fittecn t l :>) rn,nute ooscrvatton period and tnen retest tnc 
subject If mouth alcohol is not sesp~ctcd or indicated by the test results, then the officer may retest the subject 
with'.lut administering an observation period. (9-2- ! 4)T 
g. The operator should n:::rmully log test results nnd/cr retain printo,tts for possibk use in couri. 
(9-2-14)T 
h. The instrumer!t rrn.Jst not be in passive mode for the testing of subjects for evidential purposes. 
(9-2-14)T 
i. The passive mode of testing using the Lifeloc FC20 or ASIII should be used for testing liquids or 
containers of liqJid for the presence or absence of n!cohol. (9-2-14)T 
015. - 999. (RESERVED) 
-------------~------------------------------·-~ 
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John ::VI. Ohman, Cox. Ohman & Weinpcl, Idaho Falls. for 
plaintiffs and appellants. 
John D. Hansen and Michael R. Orme of Hansen. 
Boyle, Beard & Martin, Idaho Falls. for defendant and 
respondent, Simplot Soilbuildcrs. Inc. 
BURNETT, Judge, 
The issue presented is whether procedural due process 
was afforded in proceedings before zoning authorities, on a 
request to change the authorized use of a particular pared 
of land. Simplot Soilbuilders, Inc., sought and obtained 
from Bonneville County a variance to construct a fertilizer 
storage and blending facility in an area zoned A-1 
agricultural. The owners of adjoining property, John and 
Janice Gay. brought this action to vacare the variance. They 
alleged that numerous procedural errors had infected th.e 
variance granting process. and that certain findings made by 
the zoning authorities were unsupported by a skerchy 
record. The district court upheld the variance and dismissed 
the Gays' complaint. We reverse. 
The threshold question is whether the district court 
applied the correct standard of judicial re\·iew. The district 
court--following what had been a well-established line of 
Idaho decisions--held that all actions of zoning authorities 
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[651 P.2d \ alid. and thar tk scope of judicial 
was limited to for capriciousne::;~, arbitra.rini;;:-;s 
discrimination. e.g., DaHsm1 Entuprises, In,·. 1· Blaine 
Co11nr1·, 98 Idaho 506, 567 P2d 1257 (1977): 
Readr-to-Pour, Inc 1· .\le Cm, 95 Idaho 510. 511 P.2d 792 
(1973). 1 lowewr. during rhe pcndency of this appeal, our 
Supreme Court issued ib decision in Cooper v. Board of 
County Comm'r.1 o/Ada Count\. IOI Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 
947 (] 9~0). Cooper has fundamentally altered our 
pcrspecfr,e on the proper standard of judicial re\iew. 
Cooper draws a distincrion between determination of 
general zoning policies and the application of such policies 
to specific situations. The former function is deemed 
legislative, and the latter quasi-judicial. The Cooper opinion 
treats the restricted standard of judicial review, employed 
by the district court and illustrakd by Dawson and 
Ready-to-Pour, as a form of judicial defercuce to legislative 
action, This restrained standard of review is appropriate to 
such legislative determinations as the adoption of 
comprehensive plans or the enactment of general zoning 
ordinances. In contrast, a decision whether to rezone a 
particular parcel of prope1ty is regarded by Cooper as 
quasi-judicial, subject to due process protccrions. See also, 
e.g., Fasano \'. Board of County Comm'rs of Washington 
County, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 ( 1973), owrruled on 
other grounds, J\'euhcrgi!r r. Citr of Portland, 288 Or. 585, 
607 P 2d 722 (1980) 
Although the county's action here has been 
characterized as the granting of a "variance.'' it was in 
reality a change of authorized land use for a particular 
parcel ofprope1ty. The concept of a variance is narrowly 
treated by LC. s 67-6516. part of the Local Planning Act of 
1975, which had been enacted before Simplot filed its 
application with the county. The statute defines a variance 
as follows: 
a modification of the requirements of the [ zoningj 
ordinance as to lot size, lot coverage, width, depth, front 
yard. side yard, rear yard, setbacks, parking space, height of 
buildings, or other ordinance provision affecting the size or 
shape of a structure or the placement of the strncture upon 
lots, or the size of lots. 
A variance, as so defined, does not include a change of 
authorized land use. Rather, it is limited to adjustment of 
ce1tain regulations concerning the physical characteristics 
of the subject property, 
APPENDIX 2 
It is not disputed in this thm fertilizer storage 
facility foll outside the scope of permitted land 
U()CS in an A-I agricultural Th;; procured 
by Simplot made pcrmissibk a land use prcYiously not 
authorized by the zoning ordinance. \Ve cannot a 
rcqu;;st for such a diffcrcntly 
Coup2r. \Ve hold that the Cooper 
requirement of procedural Jue process is applicahk to 
proceedings on a request to change the land use authorized 
for a particular parcel of property. rcgardkss of whether the 
suh_j;:ct of such prncccdings carries the label "variance" or 
!!rc1oning, '1 
The right to procedural due process is secured by 
Article L Section I of the Idaho Constitution and by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
That adJoining land mrners, who arc ''affected persons" 
under LC.~ 67-6521. have prope11y interests entitk,d to due 
process protection has not been cont.::sted 111 this case. 
llcncc, we presume such interests to exist, "and the question 
then is what process is due." Van Orden r. S1£1te, I 02 Idaho 
663,665.637 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1981). 
The United States Supreme Court has imparted an 
elastic quality to the concept of procedural due process. 
'[Djuc process' .. is not a technical conception with a fixed 
content unrelated to time. place and circumstances .. 
[ I ]dentification of the specific dictates of due process 
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second. the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probative 
rnlue, if any. of additional or sub,titute procedural 
safeguards: and finally, 
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(651 P.2d 563J the Government's interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or suhstitutc requirements would entaiL 
Mathrns L Eldridge, 424 US 3 I 9. 334-35, 96 S.Ct 
893. 902-03, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 ( 1976): accord. Van Orden v. 
State. supra. The full dimensions of procedural due process, 
as contemplated by the Cooper decision, have yet to be 
developed. However, on the facts presented in Cooper, our 
Supreme Court held that a deprivation of due process 
resulted from (a) failure to give notice of a second meeting 
of zoning authorities (after a public hearing), when a 
rezoning request was considered and staff views were 
expressed; (b) failure to keep a transcribabk verbatim 
record of the proceedings before the zoning authorities; and 
(c) failure to make specific written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, upon which the decision on the 
rezoning request was based. Cooper. IO l Idaho at 41 L 6 I 4 
at 951. 
In the present Bonne\·ille County and Simplot 
ha\c argued that the failures identified in Cooper mcrdy 
illustrate factors rck,,:ant to due process (k:tcnnin:1tion, 
and that none of them r..:pre:--cnts a deprivation of due 
procc,s per l !mYcYCL ,pccific findings and notice of 
rnccting,--from which infer the right to reasonable 
opportunity to present and to rebut cvidcncc--have bc:cn 
recognized as fundamental clements of procedural due 
process in a rnricty of contexts. See, Gms i. Lope::, 
419 l:S. 565. 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 LEd.2d 725 ( 1975): Wolf/1. 
Ak!Jomwl!, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 
(1974). ?vloreo\eL view a transcribabk record as 
indispensable to meaningful judicial of rezoning 
proceedings where the sufficiency of notice. adequacy of 
opportunity to present or to rebut e\·idcncc, or the existence 
of e\·idence supporting the agency's findings may be put at 
issue. [ l] Under Idaho law, a rezoning decision might be 
reviewed on any of thc:se points. LC ~~ 67-652l(d). 
67-5215(g). 
We believe that all the factors mentioned in Cooper, 
together with the opportunity to present and to rebut 
evidence, meet the standards for due process requirements 
under :vlathews \·. Eldridge, infra. First, each requirement is 
germane to the property interests of parties seeking. or 
ad\usely affected by, a change of zoning. Secondly, the 
requirements afford minimum safeguards against erroneous 
deprivation of such interests Finally, none of the 
requirements appears to be unduly burdensome. Even the 
requirement of a transcribable rccord--which has excited 
some controversy in this appcal--compcls zoning authorities 
to do no more than conduct the public's business "on the 
record." preserve document;; received and produced. and 
operate a tape recorder during hearings or meetings when 
information on a rcqueskd zoning change is received or 
official action is taken. Accordingly, we hold that notice, 
opportunity to present and to rebut evidence, preparation of 
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the 
keeping of a transcribable record comprise a common core 
of procedural due process requirements, constitutionally 
mandated in all cases where zoning authorities arc 
requested to change the land use authorized for a particular 
parcel of property. 
II 
'vVe tum now to the questions of whether. and how, 
these due process requirements should be applied to the 
instant case. As noted previously. Cooper was decided 
,vhile this appeal was pending. Bonneville County and 
Simplot, in a well-crafted brief and argument, urge that 
requirements based on Cooper not he applied 
11rctroactively" here. 
APPENDIX 2 
Thcr\! arc no con:-;titutional limitations upon a court's 
chuic~ to gi\'C cith::r rctroai:ti\.-c or prospective effect to a 
ckci-;ion altering a prmr mk of la,\·. Unklcrter 1 Wulker. 
3~! US 618. 85 S Ct. !73L 14 
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1651 P.2d 56-lj LEd.2d 601 (1965): Gr<!a! .\'nrrlicm 
Roilna_r Co. i ~'->'nnhunt Oil & R<flning Co __ 2X7 llS. 358. 
53 S.Ct. 145. 77 LEd. 360 ( I 932) The choice i, 
discretionary. The range of availahlc choices include, 
applying a new rule of la,\ to ali cases ("rctro:icti\ity"J: 
applying the ruk only to future ca,c, ("prospectivity"); 
applying the rule to htturc cases and tu the case ckcidcd (a 
form of "modified prospcctivity"J: or applying the rule to 
fi.rture cases. to the case decided, and to similar cases 
pend mg on appeal when the new rule was announced ( a 
broader form of "modified prospccti\'ity"). Sec, e.g .. 
lllompson v. /lag,m, 96 Idaho I 9, 523 P.2d 1365 (l 974 J: 
Dawson 1. Olson, 94 Idaho 636. 496 P.2d 97 ( 1972). For 
case of rdcrcnce, we will call the broader form of modified 
prospectivity the ''pipeline approach." because it includes 
similar cases in the appellate system "pipeline'' when the 
new rule of law was announced. 
In Cooper our Supreme Court did not explicitly pass on 
the rctroactiYity question. llowc\·er. the court applied its 
holding on procedural due process to the facts of that case. 
Similarly, in Walker-Schmidt Ranch v. Hlaine County. IOI 
Idaho 420. 614 P.2d 960 (1980)--a rezoning case pending 
\\'hen Cooper was dccided--tbe Supreme Court reversed a 
determination by zoning authorities, and remanded the case 
with an instruction tLl the district court that the zoning 
authorities be directed to comply with Cooper. Thus. it 
plainly appears that the Supreme Court has not explicitly 
rejected retroactivity, and has. at least. adopted the 
"pipeline approach"--applying Cooper to the case decided 
and to similar cases pending when the rule of Cooper was 
announced, as well as to fuhrrc cases. \\'e need not address 
the possibility of "rdroactivity" in this case. The "pipeline 
approach" is sufficient to determine the impact of Cooper 
upon this appeal. 
Simplot and Bonneville County contend that this case 
IS outside the "pipeline" because it is not a ''similar" 
pending case. They point to the fact that Cooper and 
Walker-Schmidt were appeals from judgments upholding 
denials of rezoning request:;. In contrast. this appeal has 
been taken from a judgment upholding the grant of a change 
in authorized land use. The significance of this distinction, 
we are told, is that during the course of this litigation 
Simplot actually constructed the facility for which the 
change in authorized land use had been sought. Simplot 
does not contend that the appeal has been rendered moot. 
Hmvever. we arc now asked to exempt this case from due 
process scrutiny on the ground that Simplot had a right to 
expel'.! that the decision of th-: county zoning authorities 
u!titnarcly \Yould he upheld und-:r the prt:-Coope:r standard 
ofjudi1.:iill rc\-i~v-, 
Reliance upon an existing rule of law is one of the 
crik'ria tn be considered in choo;;ing among the Yarious 
rdroactivity and pro~pcctiYit:,,; alternati\·c~ It 1nu:-;t be 
\\:cigh-!d against t\YO orhcr critcria--thc purp1.):-:;,.; of the nc-..v 
ruk, of law announced. and the effect of rctnnctidty or 
prospcctivity upon the administration ofjusticc. See, e.g., 
Jones ,. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 570 P.2d 284 (l977J: 
Rogers 1·. Ycl!mrsronc Pwk Cu .. 97 Idaho 14, 25, 539 P.2d 
566. 577 (1974) (on rehearing): Thompson v. Hagan. supra. 
Ordinarilv. these criteria are considcrd in the decision 
announcmg a new rule of law. l lowcvcr, because no such 
analysis has yet been aniculakd in connection with Cooper, 
and h('caus;,; the instant ca;;c is as;s;crted to he dissirnilar. \VC 
will analY7e the criteria here. 
The reliance claimed by Simplot is not upon the 
pre-Cooper rule itself, but upon an expectation that 
applying the pre-Cooper standard nccc,sarily would han· 
resulted in upholding the county's zoning decision. We need 
not indulge in an "opinion within an opinion," actually 
applying the pre-Cooper standard. It is sufficient to note 
that judicial review in this case ,ms sought to determine 
whether the proper zoning ordinance had been used by the 
county authorities: whether findings of fact. which were 
entered specifically in response to this litigation and which 
consisted partly of a recitation of language from the zoning 
ordinance, were valid; and whether the findings of fact were 
adequately suppo1ied by a record 
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1651 P,2d 565] which consisted partially of disputed 
recollections by zuning officials of the proceedings before 
them. \Ve cannot say that the final disposition of such 
issues, on appeal, would have been free from doubt under 
the pre-Cooper standard. 0.loreowr. when the district judge 
was informed that Simplot had started construction while a 
petition for judicial re\·iew was pending. he pointedly stated 
on the record. that "you are building at your peril, as it 
were." Simplot's counsel acknowledged that "[tjhere arc 
cenain risks from this point on, I suppo,c." The weight that 
might otherwise ha\·c been ascribed to the reliance criterion 
is diminished in this case. 
Against this diminished claim of reliance we must 
weigh the effect of the "pipeline approach'' upon the 
purpose of the Cooper decision. and upou the 
administration of justice. The following language from the 
Cooper opinion is relevant to both of these criteria: 
It is clear that there is a pressing need in Idaho for 
established standards and procedures by which 
APPENDIX 2 
paniculctri?cd land 11,e regulation is to be administered. To 
allow the dbcrctiun of local ?oning: bodies to remain 
, irtual!Y unhmikd 1n the dctcrn1i1ution of indi\·idual right, 
is to condon;; government by men rath(:r than go\"CTnn1cnt 
by hw. [101 Idaho at 41 L 61-l P.2d at95!.] 
\Ve hdic\\: thi;:, clear cxp1\;:;:iion of purpose \VOutJ t-v 
thwarted if we refused to apply the requirement:-; of 
procedural due prncc" to this case. It appears that the 
county zoning authorities mack no specific findings to 
support their decision until faced with a lawsuit testing: the 
rnlidity of the decision. !t further appear, that the findings 
were based largdy upon one zoning board member's 
farni liarity with the property in question. The county kept 
no transcribabk record from which a reviewing court could 
dcrerminc the extent to which the infonnation known to this 
boanl member was presented at a public meeting of\\·hich 
notice had been given. or the extent to which the interested 
parties were afforded an opponunity to rebut such evidence. 
We also bclicw that the proper administration of 
justice \\ill best be served by applying due process 
requirements here. Due to the lack of an adequate record of 
\\·hat had transpired at the county level, the district judge 
was forced to take conflicting evidence. and to make 
findings, on how the zoning proceedings were conducted 
and on what basis the county reached its decision. The court 
then was required to review the propriety of the county's 
decision upon a record which the coun itself had 
participated rn creating. Developing the record of 
proceedings before an administrative agency, from 
conflicting evidence, falls outside the purposes for which a 
re\·iewing court should take C\idencc under applicable 
portions of !.C. ~ 67-5215. Cl ffill 1·. Board o(County 
Comm 'rs, 10 I Idaho 850, 623 P.2d 462 ( I 981) (holding trial 
de novo inappropriate upon petition for judicial review of 
denial of a rezoning application). :Vlorc fundamentally, we 
view this process as a dist011ion of the judicial review 
function. 
\Neighing all of the criteria--reliance on the prior rnle 
of law, the purpose of the new rnle. and the effect upon the 
administration ofjusticc--we conclude that the "pipeline 
approach" to Cooper is appropriate and that it embraces this 
case. \Ve hold that the procedural due process requirements 
we have drawn from Cooper govern disposition of this 
appeal. Because no transcribable record was kept and 
because, without such a record. a reviewing court in this 
case could not determine that the interested parties recci\·ed 
notice of all meetings at which information concerning th;c 
zoning request was received. or that an opportunity to rebut 
such information was affiirded, we conclude that the 
county's decision must be set aside. 
The other issues raised by the petition for judicial 
re\·iew likely would be mooted. or resolved, if the county 
conducted proceedings in confon11ity \Yith th:: r:.:quircn1ents 
\\'l' ha\\: dra,rn from Cooper. ·1 hcrd'orc. rhc judgment of 
the di,trict coun i, rc\·erscd. and the c:rn,c b remanded \,;ith 
direction that the district court rt:":quirc 
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rcquc,t in conformity with this opinion. 
WALTERS. C Land SWANSTRO:\L J., concur. 
Notes: 
11] Since the filing: of this appeal, the Idaho Legislature has 
imposed a statutory requirement of a transcribablc record 
upon all land tl:ic proceedings where judicial re\icw is 
anilablc. Sec LC.§ 67-6536 (added in l982J 
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APPENDIX 2 
BACKGROUND 
The State and Nauort stipulated to a brief statement of facts: Nauer(. 
consented to an evidentiary breath teat for the presence of alcohol in hii;; body after 
being provided with an administrative license suspension (ALS) warning. Nnucrt 
challenged the constitutional validity <if .his consent via n Motion to Suppress. He 
also filed a Motion in Limine challenging the validity of the standard opentting 
procedures (SOPs) and manuals created by the Idaho State Police (ISP) to govern 
evidentiary.testing for alcohol and the foundations for the admist3ihilit.y of those test 
tesults. 
The ·Magistrate Judge denied Nauert's motions. As a result of his challenges 
being rejected, Nauert enl,ered a conditional guilty plea and appealed the 
Magistrate .Judge's decisions to this Court. 
LAW 
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed on a bifurcated 
standard. State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 238 P.3d 1286 (Ct. App. 2010). FindingH 
of fact supported by substantial evidence are accepted, but the reviewing court 
considers (;he application of constitutional principles de novo. Id., 149 Idaho Ht 870~ 
233 P.3d at 1292. 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that citizens shall 
be secuT.e from unreasonable searches and seizures, and that no warrants shall be 
issued except upon a showing of probable cause. U.S. CONST. iU1F.ND. IV. Article I, 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
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Defendant/Appellant. 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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Caso No. CV-2018-1017() 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
In this case, the defendant, ifortin Eugene Nauert, entered a conditional 
guilty plea to Driving Under the Influence of AL<1ohol, a misdemeanor, in violation of 
LC.§ 18-8001. Nauort now HJ)peals to this Coutt, challenging the Magistrate 
,Judge's denials of his Motion to Suppress and his Motion in Limine. The case wus 
submitteti on the brief of Nauert without oral argument as authorized by LA..R. 
37(e). For reasons that have never been explained, tho State did not respond t,o 
N au£3rt' s brief. 
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§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides similar, alt.hough some would argue greater, 
'protection agHinat unreasonable searchas. 
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment 
requirement for a search warrant. Wheelei', 149 Idaho at 370, 233 P.8d at 1292. 
Under Idaho Code § 18-8002(1), every oporator of a motor vehicle in the Btate of 
Idaho is deemed to have given consent to evidentiary testing for alcohol 
concentration. 1 This iB commonly 1·eforrcd.to as implied consent. Among other 
provisions, the implied consent statute authorizes the imposition of a $250 penalty 
and (,he susi}om,ion of one's driving privilegei, for one year for refusal to submit to 
· testing. LC.§ 18-8002. Both the financial penalty and the loss of driving privileges 
are characterized as civil penalUcs. A driver may also be shown to freely and 
voluntarily consent t.o an ov:icl.entiary test, such as a breath test, in light of all the 
cfrcumstances. State 1J. Varie, 135 Idaho 818; 852, .26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). 
1 J.C. § 18-8002(1) stateC'!: 
Any person who drives or is in physical control of a motor vehicle in this etaoo shall 
be doomed lo have given his consent to evidontiary teetlng for concentration of 
alcohol as defined in section 18·8004, Idaho Code, and to have given his consent tu 
ovidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating 1:1ubstancea, 
provided that such testing is administered a~ the rcquctiit uf a peace officer having 
roasonable grounds to believe that person has been driving or in ai,.-tual physical 
control of a motor vehicle in violation of the provision" of sectionJ6-&0.Q4, T!,'.1.aho 
Code, or l:lection 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
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ANALYSIS 
The Magistrate Judge Did Not Err in Denying Nnuert's Motion to 
Suppress, Because Nauert's Consent to Breath Testing Was Not Coerced 
Nauert argues that his consent was unconstitutional because he wafi coercod 
into agreeing to have his breath tested for alcohol. He eonte11ds he was forced to 
agree to the testing because of the onerous penalties he faced if he we1·e to refuse 
testing. The ALS advisory informs the driver, among other things: ''You arc 
required by law to take one or more evidentiai·y test{s) to determine the 
concentration of alcohol 01· p1·esenco of drugs or other intoxicating substances in 
your body." Following this admonition ii, a list of civil penalties that may be 
imposed against a drivel' for his refusal to undergo testing. (As noted, these include 
a fine of up to $250 and lose of one's driving.privileges fo1· one year. The ALS 
advhmry does not advise the driver that the test resulti;, if (;hey show an alcohol 
concentration of .08 01' above, may be inti'Oduce,d in a criminal tdal and that such a 
showing would result in the driver being found to have been operating the vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol. LC. § 18-8004(1)(a).) 
Nauert argues that Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) requires a 
different analysis of what warning is required regarding hifi criminal case. Nt-tuerL 
seems to argue that because the implied consent advisory does not advise the dtiver 
of the cri,ninal implications of taking the test and failin·g it, that it cannot ho 
considered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver for criminal purposes. 
In McNeely1 the U.S. Supreme Court noted that: 
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States have a bmad range of legal t.ools to enforce theii: qrunk-driving 
laws and to secure BAO evidence ,n:ithout undertaking warrantless 
nonconsensual blood draws. For example, all 50 States have adopted 
implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating 
a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are 
arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense. 
Id. at 1566. 
The /1,,fcNee(y Cuu1't also cited South Dat-wta v. Neville, 459 l].R 553 (1983). 
In Nev£lle; the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed _certain aspects of South Dakota's 
intpliod consent law. Id. Tho Supreme Court found that the law allowed a one-year 
civil revocation of a driver'i:: license for :refusal t,o allow testing after the driver was 
given an opportunity for a hearing. Id., 459 U.S. at fi60. The Supreme Court then 
stated succinctly: "Such penalty for refusing to take blood-alcohol test is 
' < t~ 
unquestionably legitimate, assuming appropriate procedural protections." Jd. 
However, the U.S. Sup1·eme Court further stated in a footnote: 
Even though the officers did not specifically advise respondent that the 
test resultF. could be used against him in court, no one would seriously 
contend that hii; fnilure to warn would make tho test results 
inadmissible, had respondent chosen to submit to the test .... 
While the State did not actually warn respondent that the test results 
could be used against him [in a criminal trial], wo holcl that 8uch a 
failure to warn was not the sort of implicit promise to forego tisc of 
evidence t,hat would unfairly "t1·ick" respondent; if the evidence were 
l~ter offered against him at trial. ... 
Icl., 459 U.S. at 565 n. 16, 566. 
Given tlia.t McNeely specifically references Neville, it does not l'cqui:re, the 
invalidation of the consent to bmnth tcstin a ctiminal case. This Court is troubled 
by the advisory .warning'~ :(~ih,1re t_o m.entio~ th~t the breath test administered may 
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be used in a criminal prosecution. Were it not for the controlling precedent of South 
Dakota v. Neville, ~nd the U.S. Supreme Court's tacit recognition of tho continuing 
viability of Neville, this Court would find that Nauert's consent was invalidated by a 
fai)ure to warn him of the criminal consequences of taking and failing the breath 
tost.J:! It is not: possible to qonclude that Nauert's consent was knowing, intelligent, 
or voluntary absent t;he footnote in Neville. Howeve1·, this Court is constrained by 
the decifiion of the United States SuJ}reme Court in Neville, where the justices 
deter.mined that officers need not specifically warn a driver thnt, olcohol test results 
·may he used against him in a criminal trial. Neville, 459 U.S. at 565 n. Hi. As a 
result, this Court must conclude that Nauert's consent was valid for the purposes of 
criminal prosecution, and the Magistrate Judge did not err in denying the motion to 
·, 
suppress. 
The Magistrate Judge Erred In Denying Na.ucrt's Motion in Limine, 
Because the State Did Not Offer the Breath Testing Evidence Through a 
Valid Alternative to Expert Testimony Under the Rules of Evidence 
The gravamen of Nauert's molion in liminc is that the SO Pe and manuals, 
formulated by the ISP to implement the statutes authorizing breath-testing and its 
admissibility in court, have never been adopted as rules. Becaui,e of the ISP's 
failure to promulgate rules, the procedures required to establii,h the reliability of 
the ·breath testing were not fulfilled and. the magistrate judge should have rejected 
2 It should be pointed out that a driver in Nauert' s situation is not entitled to the advice of coun~<.11 under 
the drcun:t.!ltanccs. Matter of McNeely, 119 Idaho 182,189,804 P.2d 9TI, 9·18 (Ct. App. 1990); J.C.§ ·18-
8002(2). 1).s a result, Naµert was never informed of the legal consequences he faced in a crimmal 
prosecution and he was deprived of the ability to be apprised of the c:unsequE!nces by ftis lawyer. 
Consequently, it it; htlld. to understand how Nauert's conscmt was knowing, ilttdligcnt, or volwttary. 
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the result13 of Nnuert's breath testing whori challenged through the motion in 
lintine. This Court agrees that whatever else can be said of the SOPs and manuals 
they.are not Hrules" and therefore do not have the effect of rules. Consequently, the 
magistrate judge erred when he denied Naue·rt's motion _in limine. 
Idaho Code§§ 18~8002A(3) and 18-8004(4) purpm·tcdly exercise thA state 
legi8lature's power to regulate the admission of alcohol testing evidence in DUI 
cases.a These statutes confer upon tho ISP, an executive branch agency, the 
"1·asponsibility for authorizing alcohol content testing proceclures ... " State v. 
:l LC§ 18-8002A(3) staks: 
Rulemakjng authority of the Idaho stau~ police. Tbe Idaho state police may, pursuant lo 
chapter 52, title 67, Idaho C9dc, pr~.-.cribe by rule: 
(a) What testing ls required to complete evidentiary testing under this section; and 
(b) What calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed to comply with 
the department's requirements. Any rules of the Idaho state police shall be ht accordance 
with the following: a test for ak<Jhol concentration in breath a/i defined .in section 18~8004, 
. Idaho Code, and subsection (l)(e) of this section will be valid for the purposes of this 
section if the bre.ath alcohol testing instrument wa.4 approved for testing by the Idaho 
state police in accordance with section 18~8004, Idaho Code, at any time within ninety 
(90) days before the evident!ary iesth1g. A test for alcohol concentration in blood o~ urh1e 
as defined in section 18-8004, Id.a.ho Codc, that is reported by the Idaho state police or by 
any laboratory approved by the Idaho srete police to perfonn this tC'st will be valid for 
lhe pmposes of this section. 
I.C. § 18-8004(4) states: 
l:lor purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol conccntrntion shall be based 
upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one hUt\dred. (100) cubk centimeters of blood, per 
two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or sixty-seven (67} milliliters of urine. Analy~i:. of 
blood, udm~ or breath for the purpose of deter.mining thl~ alcohol concentration shall be 
performed by a laboratory operated by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory 
approved by the Idaho slate police under the provisions uf approval aud certification 
standards to be set by that deparl:ntent, or by any other .tnethod approved by the Idaho 
state police. Notwithstanding ttny other provision of law or :rule of court, the resulls of 
any h:!st for alcohol com;:entra.tion and records relat1ng to calibration, approval, 
ccrtificatlo11 or quality control performed by a Iaboralory operated or approved by the 
Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police shall be 
admissible h1 any proceeding in this state without the n~ce11sity of producin3 a witness to 
c.\11tablish the reliabHity of the testing procedure f9r cxam_inatio.n. 
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Besaw, 155 Idaho 184, _ -- , 306 P.3d 219, 227-29 {Ct. App. 2013) (discussing 
State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 764 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
statutory duty 
administrative rules, the SOPs, 
authority, the ISP generated 
The ISP has 
1>romulgatcd IDAPA 11.03.01.014.03, which reads as follows: 
Breath tost.s shall be administered in conformity with standards 
established by the department. Standards shall he developed for each 
type of breath testing instrument u1.,ed in Idaho, and such standards 
shall be issued in the form of analytical methods and Stl-mdard 
ope.rating procedures. [Effective] (4-7-11) 
The SOPs and manuals are not contained in JDAP A 11.03.01. Neithe1• are 
they formally incorporated by reference in that chapter.-1 No court has ever 
detormined that the SOPs and manuals constitute "rules'> for purposes of the APA. 
Besaw, 155 Idaho at_, _ n. 2, 306 P.3d at 225, .225 n. 2 ("[T]he Idaho State 
Police agency is cha1·ged with prescribing ~y rule approved equipment for testing 
breath alcohol content and standards for administration of such tests. We have 
treated [the SOPs and manuals] as 'rules' for the purpose of judicial review because 
the parties have done so and because they constitute t.he oniy materiah; by which 
the ISP has purported to authorize testing instruments and methods ..... We have 
not, however, held that these SOPs and manuals actually constitute 'rules' or that 
·
1 ()n the other hand, under IDAPA 11.03.o-l,004 the lSP has formally incorporated a list of conforming 
breath testing devices which have been approved by the ISP. This action superseded the dC'cii,ion of the 
Court of Appeals inAJfard, which said that approval of breaU1 testing devices was not an ag<,~ncy action 
subjecL to the requirements of the APA. State v. Alford, 1:;J9 Idaho 595, 597~98, 83 P.3d 139, 141-42 
(Ct. App. 2004). 
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the ISP hus 'prescribed by rule' testing instruments and methods as con(.emplatod 
by [statute]; thatissuo has never been presented to this Court."). 
In Besaw, the Court of Appeals recognized that there was ''troubling 
information about the manner in which the SOPs for breath testing have been 
developed or amended ... " Besaw, 306 P .3d at 229. The Court of Appeals found 
that certain "cmaih; a.11d memos to and frorrrISP [were] disturbing [because they] 
lacked any apparent regar<i for the way proposed changes couJd affect the validity of 
the tests." Id. The BeBaW court disapproved of tho apparent objective of certain ISP 
personnel to "thwart all possible defense challenges to the admission of breath tests 
rather than to adopt standards that will maximize the accuracy of tests upon which 
individuals may be convicted of serious crimes and deprived of their liberty.'' Id. 
The court alRo noted that there seemed to be "a conscious avoidance of any 
opportunity for suggestions or critiques from persons outside the law enforcement 
community." Id.· In a footnote, the Court of Appeals explained that avoidance of 
scrutiny for the SOPs would be impossible if they had been pl'Omulgated according 
to the AP A. Id. at 229 n. 5. 
Under the APA, an administrative rule implementing a statute mufil, undergo 
a specific process to become final, and given the force and effect oflaw. The SOPs 
and :mnnuals have not been promulgated to comport with APA rulemnking 
requirements. The ISP provides no notice in the administrative bulletin before the 
SOPs and :manuals are adopted (as required by LC.§§ 67-5220 and 67-5221); t,he 
ISP accepts no public comments and holds no public hearing on tho SOPs (a8 
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required by I.C. § 67~5222); the ISP does not submit the SOPs to any legislative 
review (aB required by LC. §§ 67-5223 and 67-5291). Certainly, ·from a procedural 
and legal standpoint, the SOPs and manuals are not administrative ruleB. 
- Given that the SOPf:l and manuals have never been estnblishcd as ''rules," the 
question facing this Court is a matter of first impression: Are the SOPs and 
manm1ls valid authority which enable the admission of Nauert's breath testing 
without expert t.estimony? To answer that; inquiry, this Court must. ask the 
unavoidable question of wha(; the SOPs and mam.1als a1·e: Since they are not rules, 
what Jegal effect do they have? 
Because the SOPs and manuals are not rules, they cannot be given tho force 
and effect of law generally ascribed to administrative rules. Mead, 117 Idaho at 
664, 791 P.2d at 414. The SOPs are, at most, internal guidelines or.standards. See 
Service Employeea Irit'l Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare,_ lOt> 
Idaho 75H, 759,683 P.2d 404, 407 (1984) (reaffirmed jn Nation v. State, Dept. of 
Correctiori, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (2007)). As internal guidelines, the SOPs 
and manuals may be changed with impunity by the agency head whenever he 
choosea, and are not vetted by anyone other than the ISP. Internal guidelines <lo 
not have the force and effect oflaw. Id. They can only govern the internal 
management of an agent~y and c:annot affect ptivate rights or procedures available 
to the J)tthlic. Id. As a ·result, internal guidelines arc also incapable of affecting the 
Rules of Evidence. 
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The APA provides no saving support for the authority of the SOPs and 
manuals. As defined by I.C, § 67~5201(21), a "standatd" is: 
(A] manual, guideline, criterion, specification, requirement 
measurement ot other authoritative principle pmviding a model 01· 
pattern in comparison with which the correctness or appropriateness of 
l:lpecified actions, practices or procedures may be determined. 
Without incorporation by reference and in compliance with the AP A, the SOPs and 
manualR have no legal effect beyond the management, of the ISP. At moi:,t, the 
SOPs tmd manuals arc unincoryJotat,ed st..-mdarcls, manuals, and internal. 
guidelineR, nothing more. As a result they have no power to give effect to LC. §§ 18-
. 8002A(3) and 18-8004(4). It is inexplicable that such an insubstantial basis could 
divert the course of the judiciai·y in the manner it has. Nevertheless, that is where 
we now ai·e. 
What the ISP has done is, in effect, const1·uct an end nm around the APA and 
ultimately the Rules of Evidence. If the ISP were required to follow rule making . 
procedures, the SOPs and :manuals would at least be subject to outside scrutiny, To 
the extent they are arbitrary or capricious, they could.be struck down. I.C. § 67-
5270, v\'hile the state legislature is not required to presc1·ibe standards to control 
an agency's rulemaking discretion, the legislation itRclf or the agency's iutci·nal 
guidelines should provide "meaningful safeguards against arbitnlry decision 
making" such as a 11.ght to a hearing or judicial review. Sun Valley Co. u. City of 
Sun Valley, 109 Idaho 424, 428, 708 P.2d 147, 151 (1985) (abrogate(l on other 
gi·ounds). As noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals, in .Besaw, there is "troubling 
information about the mnnner in which the SOPs for breath testing have been 
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developed or umended ... " Besaw, 155 Idaho at_, 306 P.3d at 229. This 
conclusion is especially disconcerting when it is remembered that t,he results of the 
breath test effectively create stl'ict liability for a drivet· whose breath test shows an 
alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. The result of where we are today is that thorc 
is no Rcientific support fo1· t:he processes to be employed in administering a test t.hnt 
holds a driver strictly liable for driving under the i11flucnco. Not only i1;, this reault 
peohibitcd by our Rules of Evidence, it also faj]a to meet the requirement of 
fundamental fairness. 
As the process currently stands, thete a1·e no "meaning:fol safeguards" to 
ensure that the SOPs ate neither orhitrary nor capricious. (In fact, the Court of 
Appeals has cast serious doubt on the SOPs and mariunls because they seem to be · 
promulgated in a way to avoid scrutiny.· Besaw, 155 Idaho at_, 30(1 P.3cl at 229.) 
'I'hel'e is no indication whatsoever that the legislature itself exercises any oversight 
of the development of the SOPs and manuals. Without oversight, there i.s no 
assurance that the SOPs and manuals ate anything other than s(;llf-serving. 
Given that the SOPA and manuals are not rules, they cannot aupplant the 
Rules of Evidence. (They also cannot abrogate the separation of powers doctrine or 
the requirement of due process, hut those are ot,her issues.) I.RE. 1102 makes it 
· clear that statutes and rules cannot 1:iffect the Rules of Evidence: "Statutory 
provisions and rules governing the admissihHity of evidence, to the extent they are 
evidentinry and to the extent that they are in conflict with applicable rules of Idaho 
Rules of Evidence, are of no force or effect." With that as a t:itart;ing point, it is a 
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fortiori that tho SOPs and manuals, which are neither statutes nor rules, could 
somehow effec_t fl change of the rule1;1 of evidence in the way sought, If Rtatutcs and 
rules cannot alter the Rule8 of Evidence, something that has never been 
promulgated as a rule 1,-urely Cllnnot affect the Rules of Evidence. 
The f1dmissibility of evidence is a matter within the inherent judicial power of 
the Idaho Supl'eme Court to establish rules and procetlures. Idaho Const., Art. V, 
§§ 2, 13;_ LC.§ 1-212 (recognizing the judiciary'13 inherent powers); and LR.R l 102 
(which tellects the judiciary's primacy when it comes to ma(;ters of evidence: 
"Statutory provisions and rulel:l governing the admissibi]ity of evidence, to the 
extent they are evidentiary and to the extent that they are in conflict with 
applicable rules of Idaho Rules of Evidence, are of no force or effect."). The 
legiidature has no power to deprive the judiciary of its powers, but may regulate by 
law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the cxorcjse of those powers of 
aH the com'ts inferior to the Supreme Court, so long as ii, cloes not conflict witl1 the 
state constitution. Idaho Const., Ai·t. V, § 13. The Rules of Evidence may only be 
amended by the Supreme Court;. Art. V, § 13 does not, ~rive the legislature the 
ability to modify those Rules of Evidence. Indeed, "to the extent, t;hnt the rule [of 
evidence] places greater strictures upon the use of such evidence than does the 
statute1 the 1·ulc must gove1·n." State v. Rick8, 122 Idaho 856, 860, 840 P.2d 400, 
404 (Ct. App. 1992). 
The Court of Appeals has, somewhat inexplicably, concluded that I.e. § J 8-
8002A(3) simply provides an alternative method to satisfy the foundational 
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requirements for s~icntific testimony in the Rules of Evidence. State v. Nickerson, 
132 Idaho 406, 410-11, 973 P.2d 758, 762-63 (Ct,. App. 1999). However, the cw;e 
law upon which Nickerson relies makes it clear that the statutes have not done 
away with foundational requirement.s. See State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 39, 764 P.2d 
113, 117 (Ct. App. 1988): 
The aCt!eptance by the Legislature of test procedm-es as designated by 
the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare docs not wholly eliminote 
the need of m,tahfo;hing foundational requirements for a test result. 
This is required even in light of the legislative directive to uGlize an 
expedient means to admit such evidence. The ndoption of the 
particular test procedure merely recognizes the validity and relinhility 
of that particular accepted teAt. It must still be established at trial 
that those procedures which ensure the reliability and in turn the 
accuracy of the tef.t have been met. 
What has boon happening with the SOPs and manuals as of late is more than just a 
legislative substitute for scientific reliability. The fact of the matter is that the ISP 
is now ve1:1ted with the unilateral power to prescribe the admission of breath testing 
evidence in Idahds courts. As a rermlt, this statute violates the Repamtions of 
powers doctrine. State v. J.tioore, 160 Idaho 17, 20,244 P.3d 161, 164 (2010) "The 
separatiou of powers docti·ine embodies the concept that the three branche1; of 
government, legisfotivo, executive and judicial, should remain separate and distinct 
so that each ii, able t,0 operate independently." (quoting Sweeney v. Otter, llH Idaho 
135,139,804 P.2d 308, 312 (1990)); Estep v. Comm'rs of Boundary County, 122 
Idaho 345, 347, 834 P.2d 862, 864 (1992) "The only exception to the separatlon of 
powers doctrine occurs where the exercise of another branch's powor is expreBsly 
directed or permitted by. the constitution." 
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It is unsettling to think that the ISP is allowed to draft SOPs and manuals 
given tho force and effect of law without any oversight. This is tantamount t:o a 
wholesale assignment of power to an executive branch agency, when the Supreme 
Court has said this is an area solely governed by the Court. It is axiomatic thflt the 
legislature is vested with the nuthority to make laws, not the executive. Idaho 
Const., Art. III, § 1, Art, II, § 1. It is even more unsettling to think that the ISP 
woidd be granted the power to dictate the procedural operationf; of the judicial 
branch. This is a p1·erogativc the judiciary, at least in the past, has been unwilling 
to relinquish. R.E. W Const. Co. v. Dist. Ct. of the Third Judicial Dist., 88 ldaho 
.426, 437-38, 400 P.2d 390, 397 (1965); t;ee also, In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 
Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (19BG). 
This Court is unwilling to endorse the ISP'.s unchecked exercise of power over 
(.he judicial process. The judiciary of this state ''has consistently acted to protect 
against encroachment of one department of government on another."Mead, l 17 
Idaho fit 669, 791 P.2d at 419. In deciding cases and co11troversics the jud~ciary 
must he mindful of the "enduring consequences upon the balanced power structure" 
of om· democratic system. Id. (quoting the U.S. Stlpreme Court's opinion in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Smvyer, :343 U.S. 579 (1952)). The ISP cannot 
unilaterally direct what foundation, if any, is required for the admission of b1'eath 
test evidence in Idaho's courts. Yet the current system amounts to tho functional 
· equivalent of a transfer of that authority. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reason~ stated above, this Court concludes that the Magjst,t·ate Judgo 
erred in overruling Nauert'~ challenge to the adm1esibilit;y of Naucrt's breath tM,L 
results without an adoquate foundation being laid. Accordingly, the Order Denying 
the Motion Limine is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
rFi.. 
Dated this 3 day of July 2014. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
~·(2~ 
J~Stegner 
District J udgc 
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11 l. 
Ha,·nes Has Faiied To Show Error in The Distric" Court's Determination That The 
Ma istrate Correct! Aooiied The Law To The Facts In Oen in Ha nes' Motion 
In Umine To Exclude The Breath Test Results 
Haynes challenges the denial of tier motion in /!mine to exciude the results 
of her breath test arguing as she did to the magistrate and district courts below 
that the accuracy of those results is inherently unreliable for tv10 reasons. 
First, she argues that the breath test resuits were inadmissible because 
ISP has failed to comply with its statutory duty to establish methods to ensure 
the reliability of breath test results in general. (Appellant's biief, pp.18-24.) The 
Idaho Court of Appeals recently considered and rejected this precise argument in 
State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied. 
Haynes has presented no cogent reason why Besaw should be overruled, nor 
has she demonstrated from the record that the testing procedures utilized in her 
case actually produced an unreliable resuit. Having failed to do so, Haynes has 
failed to show error in the denial of her motion to exclude the test results on this 
basis. 
Second, Haynes argues that the failure of ISP to comply with the 
rulemaking requirements of the !APA in creating SOPs and manuals for breath 
alcohol testing renders those SOPs and manuals void and all BAC testing based 
on those standards too unreliable for use at a criminal trial. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.24-31.) This argument fails for several alternative reasons. First, nothing in 
I.C. § 18-8004(4) requires formal rulernaking as a prerequisite to the admissibility 
of results of breath tests performed pursuant to methods approved by ISP. 
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Second, if ISP's creation of the SOPs is agency action governed by the 
requirements of the !APA, Haynes' exclusive means foi challenging such action 
was through the judicial review provisions of the 1/·.PA; she has no standing to 
raise, and neither the iower courts nor this Court have jurisdiction to considei, a 
chailenge to the validity of the SOPs as a basis for excluding breath test results 
in a cri:11inal case. Finaiiy, even if this Court reaches the merits of Haynes' 
argument, coriect application of the law shows the SOPs are not rules and, as 
such, no compliance with the formal rulemaking requirements of the iAPA was 
required. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review applicable to a decision rendered by a district 
court in its intermediate appellate capacity is set forth in Section 1.8., supra, and 
is incorporated herein by reference. 
"When a decision on a motion addressing the admissibility of evidence is 
challenged, {the appellate court] defer[s] to the trial court's findings of fact 
supported by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 
134, 306 P.3d 219 {Ct. App. 2013), review denied. Questions of law, including 
whether the state has satisfied the foundational requirements for the admission 
of breath test results in a DUI prosecution, are subject to free review. State v. 
Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 452, 988 P.2d 225, 226 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. 
Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338, 339, 882 P.2d 993, 994 (Ct App. 1994). 
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(" 
\.J. Havnes Has Failed To Show An Basis For Reversal Based On Her 
Claim, Already Rejected In State v. Besaw, That ISP Has Failed To 
Establish Methods To Ensure The Reliability Of BAC T st Results 
in order to have the results of a breath test admitted as evidence at trial, 
the state must make a foundational showing tha~ the a::lministrative procedures 
which ensure the reliabiiity of the test have been met. State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 
734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Mazzuca, 132 Idaho 868, 
979 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App. 1999) (clting State v. Utz, 125 Idaho 127, 129, 867 P.2d 
1001, 1003 (Ct. App. 1993)). To satisfy this foundational requirement, "the state 
may rely on I.C. § 18-8004(4), which provides an expedient method for admitting 
BAG test results into evidence when the analysis is conducted pursuant to [Idaho 
State Police ("ISP")) standards." State v. Uhlry, 121 Idaho 1020, 1022, 829 P.2d 
1369, 1371 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted); accord Healy, 151 Idaho at 737, 
264 P.3d at 78; State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406,411, 973 P.2d 758, 763 (Ct. 
App. 1999). Specifically, that statute provides: 
Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of determining 
the alcohol concentration shall be performed by a laboratory 
operated by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory approved by 
the Idaho state police under the provisions of approval and 
certification standards to be set by that department, or by any other 
method approved by the Idaho state police. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test for 
alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, 
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or 
approved by the Idaho state police or by any other method 
approved by the Idaho state police st'!all be admissible in a 
proceeding in this state without the necessity of producing a 
witness to establish the reliabiiity of the testing procedure for 
examination. 
1.C. § 18-8004(4). "If the State elects to proceed under§ 18-8004(4), it must not 
only show that the test equipment was approved by [ISP] but also that the 
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equipment was operated and the test administered in conformity with [!SPJ 
standards." Nickerson. 132 Idaho at 411, 973 P.2d at 763 (citing State v. Bell, 
115 !daho 36, 39-40, 764 P.2d 113, i16-17 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
Haynes acknowledges that pursuant to !.C. § 18-8004(4), breath test 
resuits are admissible if they were obtained in conformity with ISP methods 
meant to ensure the reliability of the results. She argues, however, that no such 
methods actually exists because ISP has, in seve;al instances, modified its 
SOPs for breath alcohol testing by replacing what were once mandatory testing 
procedures with testing recommendations that need not be uniformly complied 
with, thereby "render[ing] the SOPs incapable of ensuring accuracy" of breath 
test results', generally. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-24.) Haynes' argument fails 
because it is merely a rehashing of the argument already considered and 
rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 142-
44, 306 P.3d 219, 227-29 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied. 
Like Haynes, Besaw argued "that although ISP is charged by statute with 
adopting alcohol concentration standards meant to ensure the reliability of test 
results, the agency has abdicated this responsibility by replacing standards with 
testing recommendations that are not meant to ensure the accuracy of test 
results but, rather, to facilitate the admissibility of test results." Besaw, 155 Idaho 
at 143, 306 P.3d at 228 (emphases original). Specifical!y, he argued that 
because ISP had "changed a number of former 'must' testing requirements to 
'shouid' recommendations within the SOPs," the SOPs effectively fail to set forth 
any standards for breath testing. 1£.,_ at 143-44, 306 P.3d at 228-29. 
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The Idaho Court of Appeals disagreed and, in so doing, rnjected Besaw's 
argument, which was based on the dissenting opinion in Wheeler v. Idaho 
Transp. De t., 148 Idaho 378, 223 P.3d 761 (Ct. App. 2010), review denied, that 
'·nonmandatory standards [are] tantamount to no standards at all." Besaw, 155 
Idaho at 144, 306 P.3d at 229. A!ihough the Court \.Vas troubled by some of the 
information Besaw presented "about the manner in which the SOPs for breath 
testing have been developed or amended,n the Court was not persuaded by any 
evidence before it "that the SOP procedures are incapable of yielding accuiate 
tests.'' kl Because Besaw failed to present any evidence "estabiish[ing] that the 
test procedures actuaily authorized by the SOPs and applied in Besaw's case 
[were] incapable of producing reliable tests," the Court found "no error in the 
magistrate court's denial of Besaw's motion to exclude the test results from 
evidence.~ Id. 
The reasoning and result of Besaw are controlling in this case. Like 
Besaw, Haynes argues that ISP has replaced the word "must" with the word 
"should" in several pi0visions of the SOPs.5 (Appellant's biief, p.23.) And, like 
Besaw, Haynes contends that the replacement of what were once mandatory 
breath testing methods with nonmandatory methods has resulted in there being 
no "method" at all to ensure the accuracy of breath test results. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.20-24.) Like Besaw, however, Haynes has failed to present any 
5 Although failure to follow a procedure that "should" have been followed would 
not have prevented the admission of the test result, Haynes would have been 
free to argue that any such failure affected the weight the jury should give the 
evidence. 
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evidence to demonstrate the SOPs, as amended, are incapable of yielding 
accurate results. Nor has she even argued, much less demonstrated, that 
Trooper Keys failed to comply with any of the "recommended" procedures in 
administering the breath test in this case or that any such failure aciually affected 
the accuracy of her test results.6 Because she has failed to do so, Haynes, like 
Besaw, has fai!ed to show any basis for exclusion of the breath test results in her 
case. 
Haynes acknowledges the holding of Besaw but asks this Court to 
oveiiule it. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-24.) As support for her request, Haynes 
merely repeats the arguments that were presented to and rejected by the Court 
in Besaw. (Compare Appellant's brief, pp.20-24 with Besaw, 155 idaho at 142-
44, 306 P.3d at 227-29.) That Haynes believes Besaw was wrongly decided 
does make it so. Haynes has not presented any new argument and has not 
otherwise pointed to anything in the record to demonstrate that Besaw has 
proven over time to be unjust or unwise. Having failed to do so, Haynes has 
6 Haynes identifies only two "instances" in which "the SOPs have been modified 
so that the word 'must' has been replaced by the word 'should'": «1. The 
necessity to have the correct acceptable range limits and performance 
verification standard lot numbei set in the instrument prior to evidentiary testing"; 
and "2. The need to monitor the subject for fifteen minutes prior to the test to 
ensure there is no alcohol being regurgitated or in the mouth." (Appellant's brief, 
p.23 (citations omitted).) Haynes does not contend Trooper Keys failed to 
perform either of these procedures, nor could she based on the record in this 
case. Haynes presented no evidence below that Trooper Keys failed to properly 
calibrate the breath testing instrument, and the video of the traffic stop, 
introduced below as Defendant's Exhibit B, affirmatively shows that Trooper 
Keys monitored Haynes for two consecutive 15-minute periods (the officer was 
unaware Haynes had gum in her mouth during the first 15-minute observation 
period and, so, conducted a second 15-minute observation period after ensuring 
Haynes no longer had anything in her mouth) before administering the test. 
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failed to demonstrate any basis why Besaw should be overruied. See State v. 
Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483,490 (2012) (controlling precedent will 
not be overruled "un!ess it is shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the 
holding in the case has proven over time to be unwise or unjust" (citations 
omitted)). The district court's decision affirming the magistrate's denial of 
Haynes' motion to exclude the breath test results (on the ciaimed basis that there 
exist no methods to ensure the reliability of the results) must therefore be 
affirmed. 
D. 
1. Nothing In LC. & 18-8004(4) Requires Compliance With The 
Rulemaking Requirements Of The !APA As A Prerequisite To The 
Admfssibility Of Results Of BAC Testing Performed Pursuant To 
Methods Approved By ISP 
Idaho's DUI statute states it is un!awfu! for a person with "an alcohol 
concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as 
shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle" on a road or place open to the public. I.C. § 18-
8004(1){a). Subsection (4), in turn, sets forth a formula of grams of alcohol per 
210 liters of breath upon which upon which Man evidentiary test for alcohol 
concentration shall be based" and states that such breath tests shall be 
performed by an approved laboratory or "by any other method approved by the 
Idaho state police." I.C. § 18-8004(4). That subsection continues: 
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Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, tha 
results of any test for alcohol concentration and records reiating to 
calibration, approval, certification or quatity control performed by a 
laboratory operated or approved by the Idaho state police or by any 
other method approved by the Idaho state police shall be 
admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of 
producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing 
procedure for examination. 
!.C. § 18-8004(4). 
As contemplated by !.C. § 18-8004{4}, !SP has approved certain methods 
for breath alcohol testing and standards for the administration of such tests, and 
those approved methods have been set out by ISP in the form of "Standard 
Operating Procedures" and training manuals (hereinafter collectively "SOPs·). 
(See R., pp.34-123, 138-236); State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 140, 306 P.3d 
219, 225 (Ct. App. 2013), raview denied. Haynes does not contend that, in 
administering her breath test, Trooper Keys failed to comply with any of the 
methods or procedures set forth in the SOPs. Rather, she aigues the methods 
themselves are invalid because there is nothing in the record indicating that ISP 
complied with the rulemaking procedures of the IAPA, I.C. § 67-5201 et seq., in 
adopting the SOPs. (Appellant's brief, pp.24-31.) Haynes' challenge to the 
manner in which ISP approved the methods for breath alcohol testing does not 
show any basis for exclusion of her breath test results because nothing in the 
governing law requires compliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA 
as a prerequisite to the admissibility of results of SAC testing performed pursuant 
to methods approved by ISP. 
Promulgation of rules is required under the IAPA only where ''specificaliy 
authorized by statute." l.C. § 67-5231(1). The plain language of LC. § 18-
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8004(4) states that, "(n]otviithstanding any other provision of !aw or ruie of court," 
results of SAC testing ''sha!l be admissible," without the necessity of producing 
expert testimony, if the test was "performed by a laboratory operated or 
approved by the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the 
Idaho state police." (Emphasis added). Nothing in this statute authorizes or 
requires ISP to comply with the ru!emaking requirements of the IAPA in 
approving the methods for determining an individual's breath alcohol 
concentration, nor does the statute make compliance with the IAPA a condition 
precedent to the admissibility of BAC test results in a criminal proceeding. To 
the contrary, the statute provides that such resuits are admissible if the test was 
performed by ''any ... method approved by" ISP. I.C. § 18-8004(4). Because 
Haynes has nevei argued, much less demonstrated, that Trooper Keys failed to 
comply with any of the methods set out in the SOPs in administering her breath 
test, she has faiied to show any basis foi exclusion of her test results in the 
criminal case. 
The state recognizes the legislature has, in a related statute, conferred 
rulemaking authority upon ISP for purposes of administrative license suspension 
proceedings. Specifically, I.C. § 18-8002A provides: 
(3) Rulemaking authority of the Idaho state police. The Idaho 
state police may, pursuant to chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, 
prescribe by rule: 
(a) What testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under 
this section; and 
(b) What calibration or checking of testing equipment must be 
performed to comply with the department's requirements. Any 
rules of the Idaho state police shall be in accordance with the 
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following: a test for a!cohoi concentration in breath as defined in 
section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and subsection (1) (e) of this section 
wm be valid for the purposes of this section if the breath alcohol 
testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho state 
police in accordance with section 18-8004, Idaho Code, at any time 
within ninety (90) days before the evidentiary testing .. ,, 
I.C. § 18-8002A(3). By its plain language, however, the ru:emaking authority 
granted by J.C. § 18-8002A does not extend to the approval of methods for 
breath alcohol testirig contemplated by I.C. § 18-8004(4). To the contrary, the 
statute limits what ISP may prescribe by rule to the determinations of "[w]hat 
testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under this section {18-8002A]" 
and "[w]hat calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed to 
comply with the department's requirements." The statute also mandates that any 
rule so prescribed recognize that, for purposes of the license suspension 
provisions of I.C, § 18-8002A, a test for breath alcohol concentration is valid "if 
the breath alcohol testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho state 
police in accordance with section 18-8004." In so doing, the legislature clearly 
indicated that the approval of breath testing equipment and methods required 
under J.C. § 18-8004 is not itself subject to the rulemaking requirements of the 
IAPA. 
Idaho Code § 18-8004 does not require that ISP approve SAC testing 
methods by formal rulemaking. Therefore, Haynes' argument that the SOPs 
were not adopted pursuant to the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA is 
irrelevant to the admissibility of her breath test results under this section. 
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2. If ISP's Creation Of The SOPs Is Agenc Action Governed 8~ The 
Beauirements Of The IAPA a n s' Exclusive Means For 
Challen in Such Actio Was Throu The Juct·,da\ eview 
Provisions Of The IAPA 
Haynes argues that, because administrntive license suspension hearings 
"held per I.C. § 18-8002.A. are agency action contro!!ed by [the iAPA]," iSP's 
approva! of methods for BAC testing for purposes of admissibility of test results 
under LC. § 18-8004(4) must also be "agency action falling under the 
requirements of [the IAPA]." (Appellant's brief, p.29.) For the reasons set forth 
in Section 111.0.1, supra, Haynes has failed to show that ISP's compliance or lack 
thereof with the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA is at all relevant to 
the determination of the admissibility of her breath test results under LC. § 18-
8004(4 ). If Haynes is correct, however - and ISP's approval of BAC testing 
methods for purposes of LC. § 18-8004(4) is agency action governed by the 
lAPA - Haynes had no standing to bring, and neither the lower courts nor this 
Court have no jurisdiction to consider, a challenge to the manner in which ISP 
approved BAG testing methods as a basis for excluding the breath test result in 
the criminal case. 
"Actions by state agencies are not subject to judicial review unless 
expressly authorized by statute." Lau h v. Idaho De . of Trans ., 149 Idaho 
867, 870, 243 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2010) (citing I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1)); Johnson v. 
State, 153 Idaho 246,250,280 P.3d 749, 753 (2012) (same). Idaho Code§ 67-
5270 permits judicial review of final agency actions, including the failure of an 
agency to "issue a rule" or "to perform, any duty placed on it by law." See 1.C. § 
67-5201 (3) (definition of "Agency action·); Laughy, 149 Idaho at 871, 243 P.3d at 
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1059 (summarizing "types of agency actions that could be reviewed by a court"). 
However, in order to be entitled to such review, the "person aggrieved by final 
agency action'' must comply with the procedural requirements of LC. §§ 67-5271 
through 67-5279. LC.§ 67-5270{2); BV Severa e Co .. LLC v. State, 155 Idaho 
624, 627, 315 P.3d 812, 815 (2013); Lau ,hy, 149 Idaho at 870, 243 P.3d at 
1058. Where, as here, the aggrieved person is challenging the validity of a 
"rule," compliance with the procedurai requirements necessary to obtain judicial 
review requires the person to, among other things: exhaust all availabie 
administrative remedies (I.C. § 67-5271), institute proceedings for review or 
declaratory judgment by filing a petition in the district court of the county in which 
the final agency action was taken or where the aggrieved person resides (I.C. § 
67-5272(1)), file the petition within two years of the adoption of the rule being 
challenged (LC. §§ 67-5231 and 67-5273), and make the agency a party to the 
action (I.C. § 67-5278}. Haynes did not comply with any of these procedural 
requirements, nor could she ever have done so in the criminal case. 
From the beginning of this case, Haynes has sought a judicial ruling 
invalidating the SOPs for BAC testing based on ISP's failure to have complied 
with the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the testing 
methods contained in the SOPs. But Haynes he;self did not comply with the 
38 
APPENDIX 4 
judicial review provisions of the IAPA. To the state's knowledge, she did not 
attempt to pursue any available administrative remedies.7 I.C. § 67-5271. Nor 
did she "institute~ any "proceedings foi review or declaratory judgment" by filing a 
timeiy petition in the district court of the appropriate county and naming iSP as a 
party to the action. LC. §§ 67-5272, 67-5273, 67-5278. Instead, Haynes has 
attempted to have the SOPs invalidated as a basis for excluding her breath test 
result in the criminal case. Nothing in the IAPA or in any other statute, including 
I.C. § 18-8004, enables Haynes to challenge the validity of lSP's action in this 
forum and in this manner. Haynes' attempt to do so is, in her own words, 
nothing more than an attempt to make "an end-run around the requirements" of 
the IAPA. (Appellant's brief, p.25.) 
Because there is no statute that authorizes Haynes to raise ISP's alleged 
noncompliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA as a defense in the 
ciiminal case, Haynes lacked standing to bring the challenge and both the lower 
courts and this Court are without jurisdiction to consider it. See b.fil!9.QY, 149 
7 The state confesses is not aware of any specific administrative remedy by 
which Haynes could challenge the validity of ISP's adoption of the SOPs and 
methods for BAC testing contained therein. Although i.C. § 18-8002A(7) allows 
for an administrative hearing when a person's driver's license has been 
suspended as a result of failing a BAG test, failure of ISP to comply with the 
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the methods for BAC testing is 
not one of the grounds upon which the license suspension may be vacated. In 
addition, I.C. § 67-5278 appears to contemplate that the validity of an agency 
rule may be challenged in an action for declaratory judgment, without the 
necessity of exhausting administrative remedies. See also Asarco. Inc. v. State, 
138 Idaho 719, 69 P.3d 139 (2003) (mining companies did not have to exhaust 
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of validity of state 
agency's action in issuing a total maximum daily load limit without complying with 
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA). 
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Idaho at 870, 243 P.3d at 1058 ("Without an enabfing statute, the distrlct court 
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction" to review agency action.). If the IAPA applies to 
!SP's actions in approving methods for breath testing, lt also applies to bar 
Haynes' attempt to chaHenge those actions in the criminal case. 
3. 
The legislature has given ISP authority to prescribe by rule "[w]hat testing 
is required to complete evidentiary testing" for alcohol concentration under I.C. § 
18-8002A and "[w]hat calibration or checking of testing equipment must be 
performed to comply with the department's requirements." I.C. § 18-8002(3)(a), 
(b). Pursuant to this authority, ISP has promulgated administrative "Rules 
Governing Alcohol Testing." See Idaho Administrative Code (IDAPA) 11.03.01, 
et seq. Relevant to this appeal is !DAPA 11.03.01.14.03, which governs the 
administration of breath alcohol testing. Specifically, the rule provides: 
03. Administration. Breath tests shall be administered 
in conformity with standards established by the department. 
Standards shall be developed for each type of breath testing 
instrument used in Idaho, and such standards shall be issued in the 
form of analytical methods and standard operating procedures. 
IDAPA 11.03.01 .14.03. Pursuant to its plain language - and consistent with the 
requirements of LC. §§ 18-8002A and 18-8004{4) - this rule leaves to ISP the 
task of developing standards for the administration of breath tests and of issuing 
such standards "in the form of anaiytical methods and standard operating 
procedures.'' Nowhere in this rule or in the legislative mandate of I.C. §§ 18-
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8002A and 18-8004(4} is there any requirement that the SOPs themse,ves be 
estabUshed as rules in compliance with the IAPA. 
On appeal, Haynes does not challenge the vaiidity of IDAPA 
11.03.01 .14.03 or contend that that rule, which expressly authorizes iSP to 
establish methods for breath testing and issue them in the form of SOPs, was 
improperiy promulgated. Instead, she argues that the SOPs themselves meet 
the legal definition of an agency urule" and, therefore, compliance with the formal 
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA was requiied. (Appellant's brief, pp.25-31.) 
For ihe reasons set forth in Sections 111.0.1 and 111.0.2, supra, this Court should 
decline to entertain the merits of Haynes' argument. Even if this Court does 
consider Haynes' challenge to the validity of ISP's action in adopting the SOPs 
without engaging in formal rulemaking beyond that which occurred in adopting 
IDAPA 11.03.01 .14.03, the challenge fails because the SOPs are not agency 
"rules" under the applicable law. 
An agency action is a rule only where the action in question meets all of 
six characteristics. Asarco. Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 723, 69 P.3d 139, 143 
(2003). Those characteristics include that the action in question "prescribes a 
legal standard or directive not otherwise provided by the enabling statute,· 
"expresses agency policy not previously expressed," and "is an interpretation of 
law or general policy." .IQ.; see also I.C. § 67-5201(19) (definition of "Rule"}. 
Where an agency merely carries forth its assigned task without creating 
additional legal requirements or interpreting la1.v or genera! policy it does not 
create rules subject to the procedures of the !APA See Sons and Daughters of 
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Idaho Inc. v. Idaho Lottery Comm'n., 142 Idaho 659, 663-64, 132 P.3d 416, 420-
21 (2006) (Gaming Update not a rule where it did not prescribe a legal standard 
but merely explained existing rules); Jdaho State Tax Comm'n v. Beacom, i31 
Idaho 569, 570-72, 961 P.2d 660, 661-63 (1998) (adoption of tax form to carry 
out required function of self-reporting taxes not rulemaking function). 
Applying the above principles, the Idaho Court of Appeals has al;eady 
conciuded that the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA do "not apply when the 
Idaho state police approves the methods for determining an individual's alcohol 
concentration." State v. Alford, 139 Idaho 595, 597, 83 P.3d 139, 141 (Ct. App. 
2004) (emphasis added). In Alford, the defendant sought to exclude his BAC 
test result on the basis that ISP did not comply with the rulemaking requirements 
of the IAPA when it approved the use of the Alco-Sensor 111, the breath-testing 
device used in Alford's case. kl, at 597-98, 83 P.3d at 141-42. Citing the 
characteristics of agency rules identified by the Idaho Supreme Court in Asarco, 
supra, the Court of Appeals determined "the Idaho state police action approving 
the use of the Alco-Sensor 111 was not rulemaking" because it neither prescribed 
any new legal standard or agency policy nor interpreted any law. !fl The court 
reasoned: 
The DUI statute already prescribes the legal standard limiting an 
individual's alcohol concentration. Alford has failed to demonstrate 
that any Idaho state police polrcy was expressed, or that any law or 
policy was interpreted, by the approval of the Alco-Sensor Iii. 
Instead, the Idaho state police properly carried out a statutory duty 
to authorize the use of certain breath-testing equipment by law 
enforcement agencies. In doing so, it identified equipment that it 
found to be suitable for such purpose. It did not create additional 
legal requirements. Thus, the state was not required to provide 
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evidence of Idaho state police compliance v1ith iAPA in approving 
the use of the Alco-Sensor II! 
Id. at 598, 83 P.3d at 142. 
Haynes has not even cited Alfqrd; much less attempted to distinguish it. 
Nor can she, just as the approval of breath-testing equipment is not rulemaking, 
neither is the approval of methods to conduct such testing according to the 
standards of I.C. § 18-8004(4). As correctly obseNed by·the Court of Appeals in 
A!ford, I.C. § 18-8004 "already prescribes the iegal standard limiting an 
individual's alcohol concentration.· Alford, 139 Idaho at 598, 83 P.3d at 142. 
The methods for BAC testing set forth in the SOPs do not prescribe any new 
legal standard for DUI, nor do they interpret any existing law or policy. To the 
contrary, the state police action in adopting the SOPs was merely the carrying 
out of the legislative directive to approve methods for BAC testing pursuant to 
the statute. While compliance with the methods so approved is a prerequisite to 
the admissibility of breath test results in the absence of expert tesiimony, this 
legal requirement exists by virtue of the enabling statute itself, see I.C. § 18-
8004(4), not because of any action on the part of ISP. 
The methods for BAC testing set forth in the SOPs do not create any 
binding law or policy; they are merely procedural standards that, if followed by 
law enforcement, permit a BAC test result to be introduced in a criminal 
proceeding with the necessity of expert testimony pursuant to I.C, § 18-8004(4). 
Because the SOPs do not themselves prescribe or inteipret any law, they are not 
"rules" to which the formal rulemaking requirements of the !APA apply. Haynes' 
arguments to the contrary are without merit and do not establish any basis for 
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